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CHARTERS, COMPACTS, AND TEA PARTIES: THE 
DECLINE AND RESURRECTION OF A  




Originalism is widely acknowledged to be the dominant method 
of constitutional interpretation today.1  However, recent scholarship 
advancing an originalist interpretation of the Constitution reflects 
disagreement over whether viewing the Constitution as a form of 
contract can provide insight into the original understanding of the 
text.  For example, Professor Samuel Issacharoff has argued that 
one basic feature of originalism is “the underlying idea that a 
constitution is indeed a pact, a social contract designed to create 
legitimate governing institutions responsive to the political and 
social divides of a society.”2  Acceptance of a “contractarian notion of 
a constitution,”3 according to Professor Issacharoff, provides insight 
into the original intentions of the founding generation.4
Conversely, Professor Randy Barnett has firmly declared that 
“constitutions are not contracts.”5  Professor Barnett argues that 
originalists make a mistake when they seek to interpret our 
Constitution in a contractual fashion, by seeking to identify the 
 * Associate Professor, Marquette University Law School.  I would like to 
thank James Nafziger and Michael O’Hear for their helpful suggestions.  Some 
portions of this Article were presented in an earlier form on September 28, 
2007, as part of a conference entitled “America, Human Rights and the World,” 
sponsored by the Marquette Human Rights Initiative.  I would like to dedicate 
this Article to the memory of my father, James E. Fallone. 
 1. See Brian A. Lichter & David P. Baltmanis, Foreword: Original Ideas 
on Originalism, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 491, 491 (2009).  In recent years, it has been 
widely stated among legal academics that “we are all originalists now,” 
although academics continue to advance alternative forms of originalism.  See, 
e.g., James E. Fleming, The Balkanization of Originalism, 67 MD. L. REV. 10, 
11–12 (2007) (reviewing alternative forms of originalism). 
 2. Samuel Issacharoff, Pragmatic Originalism?, 4 N.Y.U. J. L. & LIBERTY 
517, 520 (2009). 
 3. Id. at 525. 
 4. Id. at 526. 
 5. Randy E. Barnett, The Misconceived Assumption About Constitutional 
Assumptions, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 615, 616 (2009). 
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underlying assumptions of the population that is covered by the 
text.6  He argues instead that the differences between contracts and 
constitutions negate the utility of contract law theory as a means of 
ascertaining the underlying assumptions of the parties to the social 
contract.7
However, Professors Issacharoff and Barnett do agree on one 
thing.  Both professors note that constitutional scholars have thus 
far failed to engage in a systematic examination of whether our 
understanding of the Constitution is furthered either by embracing 
or rejecting the notion of the Constitution as contract.8  Central to 
any such examination must be the question of how the founding 
generation viewed the United States Constitution. 
This Article argues that the Constitution has been understood 
at different times to operate as one of two competing conceptions of 
contract.  Originally, the founding generation understood the 
Constitution to operate as a charter of delegated power.9  However, 
over time both the Supreme Court and, more recently, the Bush 
administration have advanced the alternative view that the 
Constitution should be read as if it were a compact.10  At this 
moment in history, when critics of the Obama administration have 
rallied around the cause of limited government—and in particular 
have objected to the individual mandates contained in health care 
reform legislation11—it appears that the popular understanding of 
the Constitution may be poised to revert toward its original nature 
as a charter.  Indeed, in many ways the ideological underpinnings of 
the Tea Party Movement can be traced to this earlier understanding 
of the Constitution. 
Part I of this Article discusses the two theories most commonly 
used to define the scope of the constitutional domain—theories that 
provide that the Constitution should be interpreted as either a 
charter of delegated power or as a compact—and explains the 
distinctive characteristics of each theory.  Part II describes the 
Framers’ original understanding of the Constitution as a charter of 
delegated powers and the manner in which they understood charters 
to circumscribe the exercise of federal power.  Part III traces the 
 6. Id. 
 7. See id. at 617–26. 
 8. Barnett notes that “[c]onstitutional scholars have yet to examine 
systematically the lessons that can be learned from a close comparison of the 
important similarities and equally important differences between written 
constitutions and contracts.”  Id. at 616.  Issacharoff states that the application 
of contractual principles to guide the interpretation of the Constitution “is a 
relatively underexamined claim in constitutional scholarship.”  Issacharoff, 
supra note 2, at 520 n.16. 
 9. See infra notes 66–72 and accompanying text. 
 10. See infra Parts III.C–D. 
 11. See, e.g., Orrin G. Hatch et al., Op-Ed., Why the Health-Care Bills Are 
Unconstitutional, WALL ST. J., Jan. 2, 2010, at A11. 
W05_FALLONE 10/18/2010  11:45:59 AM 
2010] CHARTERS, COMPACTS, AND TEA PARTIES 1069 
 
history of how the compact view of the Constitution came to 
predominate over the delegation view in more recent expressions of 
the scope of the federal government’s power.  Finally, the Article 
concludes by identifying the reasons for the recent resurgence of the 
idea that the Constitution should be read as a charter. 
I.  COMPETING THEORIES OF CONSTITUTIONALISM 
The task of determining the authority of the federal government 
to exercise its power over individual human beings under our 
constitutional system has been described as “[d]efining the domain 
of constitutionalism.”12  The exact contours of the power granted to 
the federal government in certain parts of the text, and the powers 
denied to the federal government elsewhere, are ultimately 
functions of the locus of sovereignty in the constitutional system.13  
The degree of sovereign power delegated to the federal government 
by “the people” at the moment of our nation’s inception, and the 
consequent scope of personal liberty that “the people” retained for 
themselves, are the fundamental inquiries at the heart of 
constitutionalism.  The Framers of the Constitution debated this 
question,14 and the Tenth Amendment was adopted in an attempt to 
provide an express resolution of the problem.15
Our nation’s constitutional history reflects two competing views 
of the nature of the sovereignty possessed by the federal 
government.  The first view is that the Constitution is a concrete 
compact between the federal government and the state 
governments, with the people of the United States as beneficiaries.16  
This view conceptualizes the Constitution in standard contractual 
terms and places primacy on notions of consent.  This approach will 
be referred to throughout this Article as the “compact view.” 
The second view of sovereignty expressed in our constitutional 
history is the view that the Constitution grants no absolute 
sovereign powers to the federal government; those powers continue 
to be retained by “the people.”  Therefore, the only legitimate 
 12. GERALD L. NEUMAN, STRANGERS TO THE CONSTITUTION 3 (1996). 
 13. See T. ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF, SEMBLANCES OF SOVEREIGNTY 3 (2002) 
(emphasizing the connection between sovereignty, membership, and 
governmental power). 
 14. See JAMES H. READ, POWER VERSUS LIBERTY 1–10 (2000). 
 15. See THOMAS B. MCAFFEE, JAY S. BYBEE & A. CHRISTOPHER BRYANT, 
POWERS RESERVED FOR THE PEOPLE AND THE STATES 39–44 (2006) (reviewing the 
drafting and the history of the Tenth Amendment). 
 16. See, e.g., GARRY WILLS, A NECESSARY EVIL 145–47 (1999) (describing 
how James Madison came to embrace a compact theory of the Constitution).  
Michael Lind refers to this strand of American political philosophy as 
“democratic localism.”  See Michael Lind, Introduction, in HAMILTON’S REPUBLIC, 
at xi, xiii (Michael Lind ed., 1997) (“Democratic localists often (though not 
always) have claimed that the Constitution established merely a revocable 
compact among the states.”); see also generally SAMUEL H. BEER, TO MAKE A 
NATION 20–25 (1993) (discussing federalism and political theory). 
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authority that the federal government possesses is the authority to 
exercise the powers expressly delegated to it in the Constitution’s 
text.17  This view is in accord with the “limited government” and 
“structural” approaches that were advanced by some critics of the 
Bush administration’s tactics in the “war on terror.”18  In order to 
emphasize the fact that this approach has its roots in the basic 
conceptualization of the idea of sovereignty under our Constitution, 
this Article will refer to this approach as the “delegation view.” 
While the delegation view was ascendant during the years 
immediately following our nation’s founding, the compact view made 
inroads into the Supreme Court’s constitutional analysis in cases 
involving slavery and immigrants.  In particular, immigration cases 
have provided the context for the persistent expansion of the 
compact view within our borders.19  The theory of the “unitary 
executive,” advanced by proponents of a broad presidential power, is 
only the most recent expression of the compact view as the 
prevailing method of defining the scope of federal power.20  However, 
there are signs that popular opinion is shifting in favor of a return 
to the delegation view. 
A. The Constitution as a Compact 
The instrumentalist justification for adopting a contractual view 
of the Constitution is that it provides a basis for definitively 
determining the order of competing claims and interests among the 
people, the state governments, and the federal government.21  The 
Constitution itself provides the textual evidence of the original 
bargain by which the parties to the agreement sought to further 
their interests.  The primary benefits to be gained by reading the 
Constitution as a compact flow from the procedural method by 
which conflicting claims are resolved via reference to the textual 
evidence of the original bargain.22  These benefits are stability and 
objectivity in connection with the interpretation of the content of the 
Constitution. 
The difficulty with the compact view of the Constitution, on a 
 17. This strand of American political philosophy is sometimes called 
“democratic nationalism” or “Hamiltonianism.”  See Lind, supra note 16, at xii–
xiii. 
 18. President Bush used the phrase “war on terror” when he addressed a 
joint session of Congress on September 20, 2001.  See RON SUSKIND, THE ONE 
PERCENT DOCTRINE 19 (2006).  The Obama administration has consciously 
avoided using the phrase “war on terror,” instead emphasizing that the United 
States was (and remains) at war with al-Qaeda.  See Peter Baker, Obama’s War 
over Terror, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 2010 (Magazine), at 30, 33. 
 19. See infra notes 163–80 and accompanying text. 
 20. See infra Part III.D. 
 21. See Christopher L. Eisgruber, The Fourteenth Amendment’s 
Constitution, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 47, 50–51 (1995). 
 22. See id. 
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conceptual basis, is in identifying the parties to the contract.  
Possible alternatives are to regard the Constitution as a contract 
among the states, as a contract among the persons alive during 
ratification, or as a social contract that binds the current members 
of our society.23  The view that the Constitution should be 
interpreted as a compact among the several states was influential 
early in our nation’s history,24 and that view still has its adherents, 
but the idea is rarely advanced among academics today.  Instead, 
contemporary constitutional theory approaches the idea of a 
constitutional compact through the lens of the social contract.25
The concept of membership is an obvious starting point for 
defining the boundaries of the social contract.  Who are “the people” 
who can assert the protection of that document’s provisions?  A 
process that identifies a particular community as comprising “the 
people” for constitutional purposes will simultaneously define all 
residual human beings left out of that community as “outsiders.”26  
Logically, the terms of the “constitutional bargain” can only apply to 
those who are part of the deal. 
In his 1996 book, Strangers to the Constitution, Professor 
Gerald Neuman offered four separate approaches toward 
conceptualizing the Constitution in order to define its reach: 
universalism, membership, mutuality of obligation, and global due 
process.27  The first approach, “universalism,” treats all people in all 
places as persons protected by the text of the Constitution.28  The 
second approach, which Neuman calls “membership,” uses concepts 
of social contract to define a subset of individuals both within and 
without our borders who receive constitutional protection.29  
Neuman’s third approach is “mutuality of obligation,” which equates 
the reach of the Constitution to the sphere within which 
nonresidents are obligated to obey United States municipal law.30  
This model denies constitutional rights to persons outside of our 
 23. Id. at 57–62. 
 24. See R. KENT NEWMYER, JOHN MARSHALL AND THE HEROIC AGE OF THE 
SUPREME COURT 105 (2001). 
 25. See, e.g., Paul Lermack, The Constitution Is the Social Contract So It 
Must Be a Contract . . . Right?  A Critique of Originalism as Interpretive 
Method, 33 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1403, 1429–33 (2007).  But see SANFORD 
LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 111–14 (1988) (arguing that the Constitution 
should be read as a covenant rather than in purely contractual terms). 
 26. See Peter H. Schuck, Citizenship in Federal Systems, 48 AM. J. COMP. L. 
195, 207 (2000) (“The political dimension of citizenship . . . [is] tempered by an 
exclusionary principle that certain types of political activity . . . [are] limited to 
those who meet the standards of full membership in the polity . . . .” (citations 
omitted)). 
 27. See NEUMAN, supra note 12, at 4–8. 
 28. Id. at 5–6. 
 29. Id. at 6–7. 
 30. Id. at 7–8. 
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borders who are not bound to respect our laws.31  Finally, Neuman 
identifies a fourth approach that he calls “global due process.”32  
Under this model, judges perform a case-by-case inquiry in order to 
determine the reach of the Constitution.  In so doing, judges balance 
the potential application of constitutional protections to noncitizens 
outside of our borders against government interests that counsel 
against recognizing such protections.33
While applauding the usefulness of Neuman’s analysis and his 
historical insights, critics have pointed out that, ultimately, the 
universalism, mutuality of obligation, and global due process 
approaches are difficult to distinguish from each other.34  Indeed, it 
appears that all four of Neuman’s separately identified approaches 
ultimately rely on a “social contract” model of the Constitution.35  
That is, each of his approaches is fundamentally premised on the 
idea that the Constitution embodies a contractual set of reciprocal 
obligations between identifiable individual and governmental actors. 
Therefore, defining membership—separating those individuals 
who are protected by the Constitution’s terms from those who are 
not—becomes the core focus under any compact-based reading of the 
Constitution.  Difficulty arises, however, because the original text of 
the Constitution does not include any definition of membership.  The 
ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment helps to clarify the 
situation somewhat, insofar as it clearly identifies a category of 
individuals who cannot be denied membership (natural persons born 
within the territorial United States).36  However, the Fourteenth 
Amendment does not address the question of whether membership 
in the social contract can be extended to include natural persons 
born outside of the United States.  Similarly, the Fourteenth 
Amendment does not speak to whether corporations and other 
juridical “persons” might be included as members of the social 
compact along with natural persons.37  Finally, the Fourteenth 
 31. Id. at 7. 
 32. Id. at 8. 
 33. Id. 
 34. See, e.g., Hiroshi Motomura, Whose Immigration Law? Citizens, Aliens, 
and the Constitution, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1567, 1577–79 (1997) (reviewing 
NEUMAN, supra note 12). 
 35. See NEUMAN, supra note 12, at 9–13 (describing the “social contract” 
tradition that illuminates his four interpretive models); see also Akash R. Desai, 
Note, How We Should Think About the Constitutional Status of the Suspected 
Terrorist Detainees at Guantanamo Bay: Examining Theories that Interpret the 
Constitution’s Scope, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1579, 1604–09 (2003) 
(discussing Neuman’s “membership” and “mutuality of obligation” approaches 
as variants of social contract theory). 
 36. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 37. Cf. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 929–30 
(2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (disputing the 
idea that the original understanding of free speech protected by the First 
Amendment extends to corporations). 
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Amendment does not specify which branch of the federal 
government—the President, Congress, or the Supreme Court—
possesses the ultimate authority to make determinations of 
membership status under the Constitution. 
B. The Constitution as a Charter of Delegated Powers 
A more promising alternative to the compact view is the 
argument that the Constitution should be conceptualized as a 
document that creates a government of limited delegated powers.  
Sometimes called a “limited government” approach,38 sometimes 
identified as a “structural” approach,39 and alluded to by Neuman as 
a type of “organic” utilitarianism,40 this approach to interpreting the 
Constitution posits that the United States government simply does 
not possess the power to act in certain situations.41  Therefore, a 
delegation approach conceptualizes the reach of the text in a way 
that is not dependent on any definition of the social contract. 
The delegation view provides a structural approach to 
interpreting the reach of the Constitution.  This approach focuses on 
the scope of power delegated to the federal government in order to 
define limitations on the exercise of federal authority that apply 
even against nonmembers.42  The result is an understanding of the 
scope of federal government power that differs from the result 
obtained under contractually derived definitions of “membership.” 
The “delegation view” starts with the proposition that the 
federal government is the creation of the Constitution and that its 
sovereign power is limited.  As an artificially created entity, the 
federal government is incapable of possessing any power or 
authority that is not granted to it by our nation’s foundational 
document.43  Under this view of the nature of federal power, the 
government’s ability to perform an act does not depend on the 
identity of the individual who is the subject of government action.  
Neither a citizen nor a noncitizen can be subjected to any exercise of 
government power that is an ultra vires act.44  Therefore, it is 
 38. See Robert Knowles & Marc D. Falkoff, Toward a Limited-Government 
Theory of Extraterritorial Detention, 62 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 637, 641 
(2007); Kermit Roosevelt III, Guantanamo and the Conflict of Laws: Rasul and 
Beyond, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 2017, 2035 n.89 (2005). 
 39. See J. Harvie Wilkinson III, Our Structural Constitution, 104 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1687, 1697–1703 (2004); Christopher L. Eisgruber, Political Unity and the 
Powers of Government, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1297 (1994). 
 40. See NEUMAN, supra note 12, at 6. 
 41. Id.
 42. See infra notes 43–44 and accompanying text.
 43. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 404 (1819) (“This 
government is acknowledged by all, to be one of enumerated powers.  The 
principle, that it can exercise only the powers granted to it . . . is now 
universally admitted.”). 
 44. See Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 277 (1901) (noting the existence of 
constitutional prohibitions that “go to the very root of the power of Congress to 
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unnecessary to classify an individual as a member or a nonmember 
prior to evaluating the legitimacy of the government action directed 
towards that individual. 
A recognition that the primary objective of the Constitution is to 
limit the power of government, rather than to identify and protect a 
sphere of individual rights, has important implications.  First, this 
recognition suggests that a general distrust of centralized power is 
an integral part of the constitutional design.45  Second, this 
recognition elevates the principles of federalism and separation of 
powers to the level of basic constitutional commands, even though 
these principles are not explicitly referenced by the text of the 
Constitution.46  While federalism and separation of powers 
principles are often invoked by critics of an overreaching Congress, 
it is important to note that the allocation of powers to Congress 
under Article I of the Constitution serves as a limitation on the 
powers exercised by the executive branch as much as it does a 
delegation of authority to the federal legislature.47
C. Compact and Delegation Contrasted 
The predominant feature of the compact view is that, with the 
exception of the express guarantees of specified rights contained in 
the text, individual persons do not function as parties to the 
foundational compact between the federal government and the 
states.  Instead, the interests of individuals are promoted in the 
constitutional system in two indirect ways.  First, individual 
interests are preserved via the proxy of maintaining a sufficient 
level of state government power to serve as a counterweight to the 
federal government.48  Second, individual interests are protected by 
a strict policing of the separation of powers between the three 
federal branches.49
In regards to those individual rights guaranteed in the text of 
act at all, irrespective of time or place”).  “[W]hen the Constitution declares that 
‘no bill of attainder or ex post facto law shall be passed,’ and that ‘no title of 
nobility shall be granted by the United States,’ it goes to the competency of 
Congress to pass a bill of that description.”  Id. 
 45. See Patrick M. Garry, Liberty Through Limits: The Bill of Rights as 
Limited Government Provisions, 62 SMU L. REV. 1745, 1755 (2009) (“The 
primary motivation underlying the constitutional scheme of separation of 
powers was the framers’ fear of centralized power.”). 
 46. Id. at 1754–55. 
 47. See Robert J. Reinstein, The Limits of Executive Power, 59 AM. U. L. 
REV. 259, 304–07 (2009). 
 48. See WAYNE D. MOORE, CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND POWERS OF THE 
PEOPLE 105–06 (1996). 
 49. See, e.g., Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 452 (1998) 
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (“Separation of powers operates on a vertical axis as 
well, between each branch and the citizens in whose interest powers must be 
exercised.  The citizen has a vital interest in the regularity of the exercise of 
governmental power.”). 
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the Constitution, the fundamental characteristic of the compact 
view is that it limits the possession of these rights to those persons 
who are members of the social contract.  Only members of the 
community who are parties to the contract are allowed to claim the 
individual rights that the Constitution guarantees.50  As a result, 
the legitimacy of government action under the Constitution depends 
entirely upon whether a member of the political community is 
aggrieved.  Contracts do not create any rights for nonparties, and 
under a compact view of the Constitution the guarantees of 
individual rights contained in the text do not apply to “outsiders” to 
the community.  The Constitution is read to impose a form of privity 
of contract.51
This social contract view of the Constitution relies on 
membership models that incorporate certain assumptions.  All such 
models reveal a hesitancy to define membership in ways that allow 
aliens to impose their membership status on the United States 
without the consent of our government.52  In addition, models that 
recognize membership status for noncitizens for some purposes beg 
the question of whether noncitizens should be granted membership 
status for all purposes.  For example, acknowledging due process 
rights for Guantanamo Bay detainees under the Constitution raises 
the question of whether the detainees also possess First Amendment 
rights.53  Membership implies an all-or-nothing proposition, not 
gradations of rights. 
Therefore, the compact view assumes that the consent of the 
government is necessary before membership can be asserted, and 
that there are no gradations of rights among the members of the 
social contract.54  However, these assumptions are derived from the 
asserted contractual nature of the Constitution and not from any 
source in the text of the document itself.  In contrast, the delegation 
view does not require us to make the assumption that government 
consent is necessary before individuals born outside of the United 
States can make constitutional claims.  Similarly, the delegation 
view does not require us to conclude that by recognizing that the 
Constitution confers certain rights on an individual we are 
necessarily determining that the individual possesses the full range 
of individual liberties guaranteed by the text. 
The reason for this distinction arises from the manner in which 
individuals enforce constitutional rights.  The primary purpose of 
the Constitution is to protect “the people” in the enjoyment of their 
 50. See PETER H. SCHUCK & ROGERS M. SMITH, CITIZENSHIP WITHOUT 
CONSENT 36–40 (1985) (reviewing the advantages and disadvantages of a system 
of government built around political membership). 
 51. Id. 
 52. See id. at 37. 
 53. See id. at 40 (noting that a community’s “humanitarian values . . . may 
justify certain sorts of rights and assistance to aliens”). 
 54. See id. at 36–40. 
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lives.55  This protection offered by the constitutional text takes two 
distinct forms.  An individual plays “offense” with the text when 
they use the Constitution to assert the freedom to exercise an 
identifiable group of specified or implied individual rights without 
government interference.56  So, for example, persons governed by the 
Constitution might claim the right to engage in free speech or to 
make reproductive decisions without being subjected to excessive 
governmental restrictions. 
However, the Constitution also provides a second type of 
protection to individuals.  The fact that the text of the Constitution 
defines and constrains the scope of governmental authority also 
allows individuals to assert the existence of structural boundaries 
that cabin the federal government’s ability to act.57  Structural 
boundaries act as chains that restrain the free exercise of power by 
each of the three branches of the federal government.  Individuals 
play “defense” with the text when they argue that the government 
lacks the power to take certain actions, even in situations in which 
the Constitution does not expressly guarantee any identifiable right 
that the government is accused of infringing.58
It is uncontroversial to assert that “the people” enjoy the first 
kind of protection described above and that “outsiders” cannot play 
offense with the Constitution.  For example, the right of free speech 
guaranteed by the Constitution does not reach around the world.  It 
is also uniformly accepted that “the people” can use the structural 
boundaries of the text to play defense.  The doctrines of separation 
of powers and federalism have long been asserted by individuals as 
a means of confining the power of the federal government within 
designated bounds.59
 55. In addition to forming “a more perfect Union” between the states, the 
Preamble to the Constitution lists the document’s goals as establishing 
“Justice,” ensuring “domestic Tranquility,” providing for “common defence,” 
promoting “general Welfare,” and securing “the Blessings of Liberty.”  U.S. 
CONST. pmbl.; accord James Madison, Speech to Congress, Adding a Bill of 
Rights to the Constitution (June 8, 1789), in SELECTED WRITINGS OF JAMES 
MADISON 164, 167 (Ralph Ketcham ed., 2006) (“[G]overnment is instituted and 
ought to be exercised for the benefit of the people; which consists in the 
enjoyment of life and liberty, with the right of acquiring and using property, 
and generally of pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety.”). 
 56. See U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . .”). 
 57. See Steven G. Gey, The Procedural Annihilation of Structural Rights, 
61 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 5–10 (2009). 
 58. For example, a person aggrieved by an act of Congress need not 
challenge that act by pointing to an individual right guaranteed by the 
constitutional text that the act violates.  She can merely argue that neither the 
Interstate Commerce Clause nor any other delegation of authority to Congress 
permits Congress to legislate on the act’s subject matter.  To give a concrete 
example, some opponents of health care reform legislation charge that Congress 
lacks the power under the Constitution to compel private individuals to 
purchase health insurance.  See, e.g., Hatch et al., supra note 11, at A11. 
 59. See supra notes 48–49 and accompanying text. 
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Controversy arises, however, when one argues that “outsiders” 
to the Constitution possess the same ability to protect themselves 
defensively by asserting the existence of structural boundaries that 
circumscribe governmental power that is possessed by constitutional 
insiders.  In order to accept this proposition, it is necessary to reject 
the use of membership as a means of defining the reach of the 
Constitution.  If the Constitution does not permit the federal 
government to exercise any power—either domestically or 
extraterritorially—that has not been affirmatively granted to it 
under the Constitution, then even those persons identified as 
“outsiders” must be permitted to challenge our government’s actions 
as unlawful.  This logic leads us to the conclusion that the power of 
the federal government must be subject to the check of judicial 
review without regard either to where that power is exercised or to 
the identity of the target of the power.  Membership status is 
rendered irrelevant under the delegation view. 
II.  DELEGATION AND ORIGINAL UNDERSTANDING 
The delegation view of the Constitution is a necessary 
consequence of the very nature of sovereignty as understood by the 
Framers and embodied in the text.  The federal government created 
by the Constitution was not endowed with the limitless and absolute 
sovereign powers of a monarch.60  The people created a sovereign 
entity to rule over them, but it was a federal sovereign with limited 
purposes and carefully circumscribed powers.  This realm of federal 
sovereignty coexists with the sovereignty of the states and the 
original sovereignty of the people.  Under the delegation view, the 
federal sovereignty created by the Constitution has four 
characteristics: (1) the document defining the relationship between 
the people and the federal government is properly understood as a 
charter, not a compact; (2) the federal government (including the 
executive branch) possesses only those powers delegated to it; (3) the 
people retain their ultimate sovereignty; and (4) the sovereignty of 
the people is active, ongoing, and cannot be severed from the people. 
A. The Constitution Is a Charter, Not a Compact 
The scope of the sovereignty of the federal government is 
dictated by the fact that the Constitution is a charter and not a 
compact.  In this regard, the Constitution differs from the Articles of 
Confederation (“Articles”), adopted upon our nation’s independence 
from Great Britain.  The Articles created a federal government with 
a structure that was purely contractual in nature.61  Under the 
Articles, each of the newly independent colonies retained its status 
 60. See infra notes 69–70 and accompanying text. 
 61. See AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 25–26 
(2005) (explaining the consent-based nature of the Articles of Confederation). 
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as a separate sovereign.62  The Articles joined these thirteen 
sovereigns in the same way that a treaty might bind sovereign 
nations.  Although that document bound the states to act in a 
uniform manner on certain specified topics of mutual interest 
(notably foreign affairs), the vision of the Articles failed in practice 
because the obligations that it placed on the individual states were 
ultimately unenforceable.63
In contrast to the Articles of Confederation, the U.S. 
Constitution is not a compact among independent sovereign states.  
The architects of the new national government, in drafting the 
Constitution, produced a document that reflected novel ideas about 
the proper dividing line between the power of a federal government 
and the liberty of individuals—ideas that were simply not relevant 
to a compact between state governments.64  The intent of the 
Constitution as expressed initially in the “Virginia Plan,” which 
served as the basis for the earliest debates at the Convention, was to 
establish a federal government that operated directly on the people, 
without the states as intermediaries.65
 62. Id. at 25. 
 63. Id. at 28 (“Although on paper the Congress under the Articles enjoyed 
some important powers, it had no effective means of carrying them out.”).  Not 
all of the founders viewed the structure of the Articles as unsalvageable.  For 
example, Thomas Jefferson did not concede the inability of the national 
Congress to enforce compliance on the part of the states under the Articles, as 
he used language that recognized the contractual nature of the relationship at 
issue: “It has been so often said, as to be generally believed, that Congress have 
no power by the [Articles of Confederation] to enforce anything, e.g., 
contributions of money.  It was not necessary to give them that power expressly; 
they have it by the law of nature.  When two parties make a compact, there 
results to each a power of compelling the other to execute it.”  2 DUMAS MALONE, 
JEFFERSON AND HIS TIME: JEFFERSON AND THE RIGHTS OF MAN 161 (1951) 
(quoting Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Edward Carrington (Aug. 4, 1787)). 
 64. The search for the “original meaning” of any particular provision in the 
United States Constitution is frustrated by both inconsistent evidence and the 
impossibility of ascribing a single intention to what was ultimately a corporate 
act.  JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS 6 (1996).  The people who debated 
the Constitution, and who voted for or against its adoption, had individual and 
varied interpretations of the document.  The ultimate text is the result of 
countless compromises among these views.  Benjamin Franklin described the 
drafting process as follows: 
[W]e must not expect, that a new government may be formed, as a 
game of chess may be played, by a skilful [sic] hand, without a fault.  
The players of our game are so many, their ideas so different, their 
prejudices so strong and so various, and their particular interests, 
independent of the general, seeming so opposite, that not a move can 
be made that is not contested; the numerous objections confound the 
understanding; the wisest must agree to some unreasonable things, 
that reasonable ones of more consequence be obtained; and thus 
chance has its share in many of the determinations . . . . 
Letter from Benjamin Franklin to Dupont de Nemours (June 9, 1788), in 9 THE 
WRITINGS OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 658, 659 (Albert Henry Smith ed., 1907). 
 65. The initial debates at the Constitutional Convention found the 
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The distinction between charters and compacts was well 
understood at the time of the Constitution’s drafting.66  The use of 
the word “charter” indicated that a free and sovereign people had 
created a national government through the act of granting it 
power.67  James Madison contrasted the American experience to that 
of earlier parliamentary bodies that had been created by European 
monarchies, which Madison described pejoratively as “charters of 
participants divided into two camps.  Madison, Wilson, and Hamilton all argued 
that the Constitution should reflect the key component of the “Virginia Plan,” 
which was a national legislature that directly reflected the interests of 
individuals and that allowed majorities of individuals to express their will on 
matters of national concern without regard to state boundaries.  See RAKOVE, 
supra note 64, at 60–61.  Opponents of the Virginia Plan argued that one 
primary component of any new Constitution had to be a limit on the national 
legislature that protected groupings of states from having to bend to the 
national will on issues like slavery.  See id. at 66–68.  The division between 
these two camps expressed itself in the debate over how to apportion seats in 
the Senate.  Ultimately, “the framers could not avoid treating the states as 
constituent elements of the polity.”  Id. at 78.  A compromise was brokered that 
resulted in a Constitution that combines aspects of a charter delegating 
authority, within specified limits, to the federal government, with a compact 
between the larger and smaller states, intended to preserve the ability of the 
latter to pursue their own interests and to maintain the institution of slavery.  
See id. at 77–79.  The hybrid nature of the Constitution was reflected during 
the debate on one of the early iterations of this compromise.  When discussing 
the combination of proportional representation based on population in the 
House with equal representation among the states in the Senate, Oliver 
Ellsworth of Connecticut described the scheme as “partly national; partly 
federal.”  Id. at 68. 
 66. James Madison, for one, frequently used the word “charter” to describe 
the scope of the power that would be exercised by the new federal government.  
Admittedly, Madison also employed the language of “compact” as a means of 
explaining the system of government set forth in the text.  See, e.g., Letter from 
James Madison to Spencer Roane (June 29, 1821), in THE AMERICAN 
ENLIGHTENMENT 461, 461–62 (Adrienne Koch ed., 1965) (“Our Governmental 
System is established by a compact, not between the Government of the 
[United] States, and the State Governments; but between the States, as 
sovereign communities, stipulating each with the others, a surrender of certain 
portions, of their respective authorities, to be exercised by a Common Govt. and 
a reservation, for their own exercise, of all their other Authorities.”).  The 
hybrid system of national government established by the Constitution was 
unprecedented in human history, and the Framers often struggled as they 
attempted to explain its precise characteristics to the general public. 
 67. In an 1830 letter to Andrew Stevenson, Madison wrote: “[T]he 
Government holds its powers by a charter granted to it by the people . . . .  
Hitherto charters have been written grants of privileges by Governments to the 
people.  Here they are written grants of power by the people to their 
Governments.”  Letter from James Madison to A. Stevenson (Nov. 27, 1830), in 
THE AMERICAN ENLIGHTENMENT, supra note 66, at 478, 479.  Similarly, in an 
article published in the National Gazette dated January 19, 1792, Madison 
described the governments created by the American and French Revolutions as 
“charters of power granted by liberty.”  James Madison, Charters: Powers and 
Liberty, NAT’L GAZETTE, Jan. 19, 1792, reprinted in THE AMERICAN 
ENLIGHTENMENT, supra note 66, at 508, 508 [hereinafter Madison, Charters]. 
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liberty . . . granted by power.”68  The American experience was 
different, because our federal and state governments arise from 
“great charters, derived not from the usurped power of kings, but 
from the legitimate authority of the people.”69  In America, we do not 
enjoy our liberties at the whim of a monarch. 
In 1789, the word “charter” referred to a particular type of 
contractual relationship with its own distinctive features.  A charter 
was a foundational document that transferred power to an artificial 
entity, such as a municipal government, a university, or a 
corporation.70  However, a charter was not a perpetual or complete 
transfer of power away from the establishing body, and the artificial 
entity remained permanently subordinate to the body that created 
it.71  Interpreting the Constitution under a delegation view faithfully 
 68. Madison, Charters, supra note 67, at 508. 
 69. Id. at 509. 
 70. During the colonial era, the word “charter” had a very strong 
connotation that invoked collective entities serving a public purpose.  For 
example, colonial legislatures often used charters to establish units of local 
government and to organize religious congregations.  See STEPHEN B. PRESSER, 
AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS 79 (2005).  Charters 
were also used during the colonial period to establish companies that were 
antecedents to our modern private corporations, but even then the majority of 
these companies had a strong public-service component.  SCOTT R. BOWMAN, THE 
MODERN CORPORATION AND AMERICAN POLITICAL THOUGHT 38 (1996).  The 
universe of early American corporations was typically comprised of “banks, 
insurance companies, universities, and companies engaged in constructing 
turnpikes, bridges and canals.”  PRESSER, supra, at 78.  Therefore, even in the 
case of private companies, the use of charters in the colonial era was associated 
with entities that served a public purpose and functioned much like today’s 
“public utilities.” Id.; see also Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. 
Ct. 876, 949 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(“Those few corporations that existed at the founding were authorized by grant 
of a special legislative charter.”); JAMES WILLARD HURST, THE LEGITIMACY OF THE 
BUSINESS CORPORATION IN THE LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, 1780–1970, at 15 
(2004) (“[A]lmost all of the business enterprises incorporated here in the 
formative generation starting in the 1780’s were chartered for activities of some 
community interest . . . .”).  The development of modern corporate law in 
America came after the Revolution, as the business functions of corporations 
began to evolve away from the quasi-public objectives of government, such as 
regulating trade, and instead began to increasingly reflect private objectives.  
BOWMAN, supra, at 40–41; see also NEWMYER, supra note 24, at 246–48. 
 71. This traditional understanding of the law of contract was at issue in the 
dispute between the trustees of Dartmouth College, who claimed that the terms 
of the school’s charter were constitutionally protected from subsequent 
amendment, and the New Hampshire legislature, who claimed the authority to 
recall powers previously granted under the charter.  Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. 
Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819).  Thomas Jefferson rejected the idea 
that the legislature lacked the power to alter the charter, calling it equivalent 
to the idea “that the earth belongs to the dead, and not to the living.”  Letter 
from Thomas Jefferson to William Plumer (July 21, 1816), reprinted in WILLIAM 
PLUMER, JR., LIFE OF WILLIAM PLUMER 440, 441 (A.P. Peabody ed., 1857).  In the 
Dartmouth case, the Supreme Court decided the issue in favor of the trustees, 
thereby revolutionizing the American law of contract and making possible the 
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reflects the nature of the Constitution as a charter.72
B. Executive Power Is Limited to Delegated Powers 
The delegation view also interprets the Constitution as limiting 
the sovereign authority of the legislative and executive branches to 
the exercise of delegated powers.73  The text enumerates the 
specified powers that a sovereign people have delegated to their 
government and sets signposts beyond which the government has no 
authority to act.74  James Madison was an advocate for a strong 
federal government during the ratification debates, but even he 
insisted that the powers exercised by that government must “stay 
within whatever limits have been clearly agreed upon.”75
In particular, the idea of delegated powers is antithetical to the 
existence of any “inherent” sovereign power on the part of the 
federal government beyond the scope of the grant contained in the 
text.76  James Madison anticipated the argument that a charter’s 
delegation of power to the federal government might be interpreted 
expansively to include not only the powers specified in the text but 
also an inherent power of government to do all that is necessary for 
its own preservation.77  He argued that the care with which the 
drafters of the constitutional text defined the delegated powers of 
the federal government belied any argument that the government 
possessed powers in excess of those delegated.  Therefore, a power 
that is not delegated by the Constitution is the same as a power that 
is withheld from the federal government.78  It makes no difference 
rise of modern corporations.  Trs. of Dartmouth Coll., 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 712–
13. 
 72. Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 
1432–35 (1987). 
 73. Randy E. Barnett, Three Federalisms, 39 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 285, 286 
(2008). 
 74. See SAUL CORNELL, THE OTHER FOUNDERS 188 (1999) (“In explaining the 
nature of constitutional interpretation, Madison noted that the overarching 
principle was that the grant of power to the new federal government was 
intended to be limited: ‘It is not a general grant, out of which particular powers 
are excepted; it is a grant of particular powers only, leaving the general mass in 
other hands.’”). 
 75. READ, supra note 14, at 13. 
 76. For example, James Madison wrote: “[I]t is evident that the objects for 
which the Constitution was formed were deemed attainable only by a particular 
enumeration and specification of each power granted to the Federal 
Government; reserving all others to the people, or to the States.”  James 
Madison, The Alien and Sedition Acts: Address of the General Assembly to the 
People of the Commonwealth of Virginia (Jan. 23, 1799), in THE AMERICAN 
ENLIGHTENMENT, supra note 66, at 513, 514. 
 77. See READ, supra note 14, at 12 (“What Madison argued against . . . was 
the use of implied powers in a way that allowed the indefinite expansion of 
governmental power.”). 
 78. See Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Jan. 12, 1800), in 
6 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON, 1790–1802, at 345, 347 (Gaillard Hunt ed. 
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whether the advocates of expansive powers label them as inherent, 
implied, or expedient.79
Perhaps the most significant limitation that the Constitution 
places on the federal government is contained in the Supremacy 
Clause.  The Constitution itself, the law of nations, and acts of 
Congress passed pursuant to its delegated power are declared the 
supreme law of the land.80  This provision does more than enforce 
the precedence of federal sources of law over law that originates in 
the states.  It also denies the three federal branches of government 
the power to contravene either the Constitution or international 
law.81
Madison did not fear a powerful executive branch simply 
because of the quantum of authority that it possessed.  Rather, what 
he most feared about executive authority was its potential to claim 
to possess any power deemed necessary to defend the nation.  “For 
Madison the possibility of reconciling the power of government and 
the liberty of citizens depends above all upon the existence of clear 
boundaries to governmental power publicly agreed upon by an 
enduring majority of the people. . . . [O]nce they [are] agreed upon, 
liberty is threatened if they are trespassed.”82  Interpreting the 
Constitution under a delegation view precludes the possibility that 
the executive branch will exceed the limited scope of governmental 
power that Madison sought desperately to demarcate. 
C. The People Retain Absolute Sovereignty 
The delegation view presupposes that the people retain the 
ultimate authority under our constitutional system.83  It therefore 
stands in contrast to theories of executive power that posit the 
existence of an inherent and unbounded authority in the field of 
foreign affairs, such as the theory of the “unitary executive.”84  The 
recognition that the people are the source of all sovereign authority 
is incompatible with the assertion that the executive branch 
possesses any powers derived external to the constitutional text. 
Proponents of the theory of the unitary executive often rely on 
the writings of Alexander Hamilton to provide an originalist 
justification for their views.85  Hamilton argued that a unitary 
federal government, rather than a confederation of states, was best 
suited to defend the nation as a whole.86  He also argued that the 
1906). 
 79. Id. 
 80. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
 81. Id. 
 82. READ, supra note 14, at 28. 
 83. See Amar, supra note 72, at 1435–36. 
 84. See infra Part III.D. 
 85. See, e.g., JOHN YOO, WAR BY OTHER MEANS 119–20 (2006). 
 86. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 23, at 148, 148–50 (Alexander Hamilton) 
(Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
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powers of the executive branch of the federal government should be 
lodged in the hands of one individual rather than in a multiperson 
council so that those powers could be exercised with energy in the 
face of exigencies.87  From these two propositions, supporters of the 
theory of the unitary executive arrive at the conclusion that 
Hamilton supported an executive branch with almost unbridled 
power when it acted in the realm of national security.88
There is a difference between asserting a federal locus for the 
power of the national defense, on the one hand, and locating that 
power exclusively in the hands of the federal government’s executive 
branch on the other.  There is also a difference between a 
constitutional text that scrupulously avoids any role for the states in 
the determination of national security measures, on the one hand, 
and a text that places no structural limits at all on the means that 
the executive branch uses to advance national security, on the other.  
In neither case does the acceptance of the first premise necessarily 
lead to the second. 
In fact, Alexander Hamilton believed that the constitutional 
text did place limits on the exercise of federal power, whether in the 
realm of national security or otherwise.  His writings are consistent 
with the delegation view of the Constitution, albeit in a less direct 
way than Madison’s view.  For example, like Madison, Hamilton 
argued that a Bill of Rights was unnecessary in the original text 
because the federal government created by the Constitution already 
lacked the delegated power to take actions that infringe on 
individual liberties.89  Hamilton did not consider a bill of rights to be 
necessary because the Constitution expresses a system under which 
the sovereign people retain the ultimate power.90
 87. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 70, supra note 86, at 421, 422–24 (Alexander 
Hamilton). 
 88. See YOO, supra note 85, at 119–20 (“The Framers . . . created an 
executive with its own independent powers to manage foreign affairs and 
address emergencies which, almost by definition, cannot be addressed by 
existing laws.”). 
 89. Hamilton asked in The Federalist No. 84: “[W]hy declare that things 
shall not be done which there is no power to do?”  THE FEDERALIST NO. 94, supra 
note 86, at 509, 513 (Alexander Hamilton).  This question assumes a scope of 
federal sovereignty along the lines of the ultra vires doctrine: the federal 
government is the creation of the people and therefore cannot possess more 
powers than are granted to it by its creator.  See also Madison, supra note 55. 
 90. See Amar, supra note 72, at 1429 (referring to the preexisting 
sovereignty of “the people” as one of the “first principles” of the Constitution).  
In The Federalist No. 84, Hamilton describes the nature of a bill of rights in the 
general sense as being a form of reservation of rights by the people against the 
otherwise absolute sovereignty of the king (using the Magna Carta, the Petition 
of Right under the reign of Charles the First, and the Declaration of Right  
presented to the Prince of Orange in 1688 as examples of typical “bills of 
rights”).  THE FEDERALIST NO. 84, supra note 86, at 509, 512 (Alexander 
Hamilton).  Hamilton argued that a constitution is a fundamentally different 
text from a bill of rights, because under a constitution the people retain their 
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The main distinction between the views of Madison and 
Hamilton in regards to delegated power may be a matter of timing.  
Madison felt that the outer limits of federal government power were 
permanently set by the understanding of the people at the time that 
the Constitution was ratified.91  Those boundaries could not be 
expanded short of a constitutional amendment.  Hamilton seems to 
have believed that these limits could be loosened or lifted through 
precipitous action by the federal government, explained and 
defended to the public, so long as the public demonstrated its 
approval of the new boundaries.92  Hamilton’s conception of 
sovereignty allowed for the possibility that later generations of 
Americans might approve of a stronger national government than 
was originally envisioned if they were persuaded that the extra 
authority was merited, without the need to resort to a constitutional 
amendment.93  Significantly, however, while he seemed to believe 
that the people could consent to an expansion of federal sovereignty 
beyond its original confines, Hamilton did not argue that the 
executive branch possessed the power to expand its authority on a 
unilateral basis. 
Hamilton’s writings illuminate the manner in which delegated 
authority is a fundamental corollary of the very nature of 
ultimate sovereignty.  Id.  (“[Under a constitution], in strictness, the people 
surrender nothing; and as they retain everything they have no need of 
particular reservations . . . .”).  Therefore, he argued, the U.S. Constitution as 
originally drafted had no need for a bill of rights.  But see READ, supra note 14, 
at 75 (arguing that Hamilton did not accept the concept of an active sovereignty 
of the people other than in some “nebulous sense”). 
 91. READ, supra note 14, at 58. 
 92. Id. at 85–86. 
 93. Id.  Hamilton does not appear to have considered the consequences if 
the federal government asserted increased powers only to find them rejected by 
the public.  He seems to anticipate a process that redraws the lines of 
sovereignty through the government’s instigation of a constitutional crisis.  See 
id. at 86.  Hamilton’s later proposal to charter a national bank and his adoption 
of the principle that even a federal government limited in its ends could employ 
tremendous discretion in choosing the appropriate means to achieve those ends 
later led to a philosophical split with Madison.  The result was that Madison 
came to align himself with the Anti-Federalists in opposition to the National 
Bank.  However, this split between Madison and Hamilton was not due to 
Madison changing his position on the nature of sovereignty.  Rather, Madison 
opposed Hamilton’s proposed bank because he saw it as inconsistent with 
original assumptions concerning the proper ends for which the federal power 
would be used.  See CORNELL, supra note 74, at 187–91 (explaining the 
constitutional conflict over the chartering of a national bank).  Madison was 
convinced that it had been settled at the time of ratification that the federal 
government lacked the power to charter a national bank.  READ, supra note 14, 
at 29; see also NEWMYER, supra note 24, at 104 (“Among those nationalists who 
disagreed with Hamilton’s version of nationalism was Madison himself.”).  For 
his part, Hamilton believed that, so long as the general public accepted the 
national bank as a proper means to pursue legitimate federal ends, the bank 
was constitutional. 
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sovereignty.  If the people are truly sovereign in the United States, 
then the government created by the people cannot possess more 
power than do the people.94  To speak of the “inherent” powers of the 
executive branch in the realm of foreign affairs is to deny the 
ultimate sovereignty of the people over the exercise of foreign 
affairs.  Only by reading the Constitution as a compact can we 
conclude that the people have severed all ties to their sovereignty 
and surrendered it to the federal government. 
D. Popular Sovereignty Cannot Be Severed from the People 
The use of the delegation view in order to police the scope of the 
sovereign power delegated to the federal government is consistent 
with the Constitution’s overall conception of popular sovereignty.  
James Wilson, whose arguments were influential during the debate 
over ratification, believed that a national body of “the people” 
predated the creation of both the state and federal governments.95  
Subsequent to the ratification of the Constitution, “the people” in a 
national sense remain superior to every level of government.  
Therefore, the Constitution reflects a concept of popular sovereignty 
that cannot be severed from the people.96  The delegation view 
 94.  See supra notes 89–90 and accompanying text (discussing Hamilton’s 
delegation view, under which the sovereign people retain the ultimate power). 
 95. See James Wilson, Speech Before the Ratifying Convention of 
Pennsylvania (Nov. 26, 1787), in 1 THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 525, 543 
(James DeWitt Andrews ed., 1896) (“The truth is, that, in our governments, the 
supreme, absolute, and uncontrollable power remains in the people.”); see also 
READ, supra note 14, at 17 (“Wilson’s response to the complications of 
federalism was to assert the existence of a single, national sovereign people 
standing above all authority conflicts.”). 
 96. Fundamentally, Wilson rejected the idea that “the people” could ever 
completely delegate away their sovereign powers to any governmental unit.  
MOORE, supra note 48, at 109.  Instead, Wilson believed that the Constitution 
preserved separate and ongoing realms of power for the states, for the federal 
government, and for the people, with the people retaining both ultimate 
sovereignty and the ability to recall to themselves any delegated power as they 
saw fit.  Id. at 107–09.  “He never wavered from his faith that there existed in 
the United States a single, national sovereign people capable of distributing 
power between national government and state governments while remaining 
superior to both.”  READ, supra note 14, at 89.  Wilson argued that the state 
governments that had been adopted upon independence received a different 
form of delegated authority from the type of delegated authority that the federal 
government received.  The state governments received a delegation of all 
governmental authority subject to express reservations by the people intended 
to preserve individual liberties.  MOORE, supra note 48, at 107–08.  Under the 
U.S. Constitution, in contrast, the people delegated only an express authority to 
the federal government, leaving all residual sovereignty in the hands of either 
the states or private individuals (depending on whether the relevant state 
constitution allocated that residual power to the state government or preserved 
it as a part of individual liberty).  Id.  Under Wilson’s constitutional design, 
therefore, each of the three sovereigns—the newly created federal government, 
the preexisting states, and a national community of “the people”—comprised 
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reflects this understanding of the fundamental nature of the 
sovereignty possessed by the people. 
The case of Schneiderman v. United States97 demonstrates how 
the residual sovereignty of the people continues to be preserved from 
government encroachment.  The federal government sought to 
revoke Mr. Schneiderman’s citizenship on the grounds that his 
membership in the Communist Party rendered it impossible for him 
to truthfully claim an “attachment to the principles of the 
Constitution,” as required under the relevant naturalization 
statute.98  A deeply divided Supreme Court held that membership in 
the Communist Party was not incompatible with the principles of 
the Constitution, despite the fact that the Communist Party 
platform called for the communal ownership of property and for 
restructuring the federal government in order to eliminate both the 
Senate and the Supreme Court.99  In dissent, Chief Justice Stone 
claimed that the majority was denying the existence of any 
unchangeable principles in the Constitution.100
Traditionally, Schneiderman has been interpreted through the 
lens of individual rights.  Under this interpretation, the case stands 
as an affirmation of Mr. Schneiderman’s First Amendment rights.101  
However, the case is better understood as a rebuke of the idea that 
the grant of sovereignty to the federal government in the 
Constitution is a static one.  The dissent views the Constitution as a 
binding contract, and the current structure of the federal 
government as reflecting a bargain that cannot be altered.  The 
distinct actors that contemporaneously exercised independent authority in a 
three part confederation.  Id. at 107 (“[Wilson] presumed, in short, that powers 
of the United States government, powers reserved to the respective states, and 
some of the people’s rights and powers were mutually exclusive normative 
categories.”).  A system in which three actors expressed different forms of 
sovereignty would not be feasible if the federal government possessed absolute 
sovereignty, and therefore Wilson refused to view the Constitution 
simplistically as a compact whereby “the people” granted their sovereignty to 
the federal government.  Nor did Wilson view the Constitution as a compact 
between sovereign states in which the states agreed to cede authority to a 
federal government.  Instead, Wilson treated the powers exercisable by the 
federal government under the Constitution “as analogous to powers of attorney 
or powers of trust, not irrevocable transfers or contractual commitments.”  Id. 
at 110.  Wilson’s ideas influenced many early Federalists, including Supreme 
Court Justice John Marshall.  See Michael Lind, Preface to James Wilson, 
Popular Sovereignty and the Constitution, in HAMILTON’S REPUBLIC, supra note 
16, at 85, 85; NEWMYER, supra note 24, at 173–74. 
 97. 320 U.S. 118 (1943). 
 98. Id. at 121 & n.2. 
 99. Id. at 145–47, 157–61. 
 100. Id. at 181 (Stone, C.J., dissenting) (claiming such principles include 
“protection of civil rights and of life, liberty and property, the principle of 
representative government, and the principle that constitutional laws are not to 
be broken down by planned disobedience”). 
 101. See LEVINSON, supra note 25, at 148. 
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majority, in contrast, affirms the existence of a sovereign power of 
the people to choose a new structure for the federal government that 
differs significantly from the original structure embodied in the text.  
The majority opinion rejects any interpretation of the naturalization 
statute that operates to limit the people’s prerogative to exercise its 
sovereign power in the future. 
Therefore, it is incompatible with the Framers’ original intent to 
read the Constitution as a device that completely severs sovereignty 
from the people and transfers it to the federal government, whether 
it be a wholesale transfer or one limited to the authority to conduct 
foreign affairs.  Instead, the text of the Constitution defines an 
ongoing relationship among the states, the federal government, and 
the people.  None of these three sovereign entities possesses any 
authority independent of the boundaries of that relationship.  
Interpreting the Constitution under a delegation view preserves this 
unique tripartite relationship. 
E. The Delegation View Post-Ratification 
The legitimacy of the delegation view is further confirmed by 
events following the ratification of the Constitution.  The primary 
architects of the Constitution expressed their opposition to the view 
that the federal government possesses the whole of sovereignty as 
the result of a contractual devise, whether originating from “the 
people” or from the states.102  Instead, the Framers had 
conceptualized the relationship between the people and the federal 
government along the lines of a clearly defined charter—setting 
forth specific purposes and modes of operation for the exercise of 
governmental functions.  The founding generation believed that the 
constitutional text as drafted was sufficiently clear and precise103 to 
accurately reflect their underlying assumptions concerning the 
proper scope of federal authority.104  This original understanding of 
 102. See H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 
98 HARV. L. REV. 885, 930 (1985).  Powell denies that the Framers had any 
intent to create a compact or contract when they drafted the Constitution, citing 
the explanations of the Framers during the debate over ratification and 
emphasizing the text’s failure to include any reference to either a “compact” or 
to the states as contracting parties.  Id. at 929–30. 
 103. The usage of ambiguous language in the Constitution does not require 
the reader to acquiesce in “an indefinitely expansive rule of construction.”  
READ, supra note 14, at 39.  As explained by historian James Read, “There is a 
difference between conceding that some powers must be left to implication and 
setting into motion a process by which governmental power can be continually 
expanded [beyond the Constitution’s agreed-upon boundaries].”  Id. 
 104. It must be conceded that not everyone reads the text in the same way.  
Critics of the Constitution were alarmed precisely because they interpreted its 
language as a compact by which the governed ceded to the federal government a 
breadth of sovereignty that was coextensive with the absolute power of an 
English monarch.  The debate over the ratification of the Constitution reflects 
these differing interpretations of the text.  During the debate over ratification, 
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the meaning of the text persisted in the years after ratification. 
In particular, early Supreme Court opinions are notable for the 
manner in which they reject the compact view and embrace the 
delegation view.  In Chisholm v. Georgia, Justice James Wilson gave 
precedence to the sovereignty of the national community of “the 
people” over the sovereign immunity of the state of Georgia.105  Chief 
Justice John Jay concurred with Justice Wilson, going so far as to 
refer to the people as “joint sovereigns” with the states.106
In later Supreme Court cases, such as McCulloch v. Maryland107 
and Gibbons v. Ogden,108 Chief Justice John Marshall espoused a 
particularly expansive view of the federal sovereign power in 
contraposition to the power reserved to the states.109  However, 
Marshall’s opinions in these cases were premised on his 
determination that the federal government was acting within the 
delegated spheres of authority envisioned by the Framers.110  
Marshall frustrated attempts to subordinate federal sovereignty to 
state control, but his opinions left the sovereignty of the people 
unscathed.111  Many of these early cases were argued before the 
Court by Daniel Webster, who drew on Madison’s and Hamilton’s 
writings in order to dispute the idea that the United States was a 
“compact” among sovereign states.112  Webster agreed with James 
Federalists argued against the inclusion of a bill of rights, promising that 
federal power would be interpreted narrowly under the text.  See MOORE, supra 
note 48, at 105–06.  Anti-Federalists called for a bill of rights precisely in order 
to minimize any possibility that the original text would be read to create a 
federal government of vast powers.  Id. at 106.  With the birth of political 
parties in the decades after ratification, both sides switched positions.  Under 
President John Adams, many Federalists became advocates of an expansive 
interpretation of federal power, effectively adopting the interpretation of the 
Constitution’s language that the Anti-Federalists had used to justify their 
opposition to the Constitution.  Meanwhile, the Anti-Federalists reemerged as 
Jeffersonian Republicans who now asserted a reading of the constitutional text 
premised on the assumption that the document only delegated limited authority 
to the national government.  Id.; see also CORNELL, supra note 74, at 164–68. 
 105. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 453–57 (1793).  The decision 
of the Supreme Court was superseded by the Eleventh Amendment, which 
limited federal court jurisdiction in cases in which states are a party.  See READ, 
supra note 14, at 106; Randy E. Barnett, The People or the State?: Chisholm v. 
Georgia and Popular Sovereignty, 93 VA. L. REV. 1729, 1737–38 (2007). 
 106. Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 479 (Jay, C.J., concurring). 
 107. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). 
 108. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). 
 109. See NEWMYER, supra note 24, at 337–53. 
 110. Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 196–97; McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 405. 
 111. “The government of the Union . . . is, emphatically, and truly, a 
government of the people. . . .  Its powers are granted by them . . . and for their 
benefit.”  McCullough, 17 U.S. at 404–05; see also NEUMAN, supra note 12, at 
60–61 (discussing Marshall’s resistance towards interpretations of the 
Constitution as a compact). 
 112. See NEUMAN, supra note 12, at 78–79; GARRY WILLS, LINCOLN AT 
GETTYSBURG 129–33 (1992).  Webster also served as a United States Senator, 
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Wilson that the United States was a single nation from the moment 
of revolution, before the individual states even existed as separate 
political entities.113
The influence of the delegation view can also be seen beyond the 
opinions of the Supreme Court.  Justice Joseph Story, in his 
influential book Commentaries on the Constitution of the United 
States, adopted and expanded on the anticompact ideas of John 
Marshall and Daniel Webster.114  Delegation ideas also influenced 
early states’ rights advocates such as John Taylor of Caroline.115
Later in our nation’s history, Abraham Lincoln’s legal argument 
that the secession of the Confederate states was unconstitutional 
reflected the influence of both Daniel Webster and Justice Story.116  
Lincoln’s argument against secession is premised upon the idea that 
the nation was formed by the people as a whole upon independence 
from Great Britain, rather than by the states via a constitutional 
compact.117  As a consequence, Lincoln believed that only the people 
acting as a whole nation possessed the power to dissolve the 
union.118  Indeed, an argument can be made that throughout 
American history it has been the delegation view that has prevailed 
whenever there was a major struggle “to determine what kind of a 
country the United States would be.”119
Therefore, the delegation view derives its legitimacy as a means 
of interpreting the constitutional text from the fact that it vindicates 
the original conception of the sovereignty of the federal 
government.120  Enforcing a textual limit on the power of the federal 
government to exercise nondelegated powers is consistent with the 
Framers’ intention to preserve the ultimate sovereign power in “the 
people.”  Recognizing that all humankind can object to overreaching 
and his most famous speech in the Senate was a rebuke of the compact theory of 
the Constitution.  See Daniel Webster, Second Reply to Hayne, (Jan. 26, 1830), 
in 1 THE PAPERS OF DANIEL WEBSTER: SPEECHES AND FORMAL WRITINGS 1800–
1833, at 284, 330–31 (Charles M. Wiltse ed., 1986). 
 113. See READ, supra note 14, at 110; WILLS, supra note 112, at 129–33. 
 114. See NEWMYER, supra note 24, at 384–85; WILLS, supra note 112, at 129–
32.  See generally JOSEPH STORY, 1 COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE 
UNITED STATES 221–72 (5th ed. 1994). 
 115. See NEUMAN, supra note 12, at 57–58; Barnett, supra note 105, at 
1735–36. 
 116. See Michael Lind, Preface to Daniel Webster, The Second Reply to 
Hayne, in HAMILTON’S REPUBLIC, supra note 16, at 108, 108 (noting that 
Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address reflects a conscious attempt to invoke the 
language of Webster’s famous “Second Reply to Hayne” speech). 
 117. See READ, supra note 14, at 117; WILLS, supra note 112, at 129–33. 
 118. See Abraham Lincoln, Message to Congress in Special Session, in 
ABRAHAM LINCOLN: SPEECHES AND WRITINGS 1859–1865, at 246, 255 (Don E. 
Fehrenbacher ed., 1989) (“Our States have neither more, nor less power, than 
that reserved to them, in the Union, by the Constitution—no one of them ever 
having been a State out of the Union.”). 
 119. See Lind, supra note 16, at xiv. 
 120. See Barnett, supra note 105, at 1757–58. 
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executive branch action, without limiting the benefits of this 
approach to the members of the social contract, functions as a way of 
policing illegitimate exercises of federal government power.121  
However, despite evidence that the Constitution should be read 
under a delegation view, our nation’s ongoing dialogue about the 
original understanding of the text122—a dialogue that ensures that 
the Constitution continues to be relevant in an ever-changing 
world123—has often favored the compact view of the Constitution 
over the delegation view.  Precisely how the compact view came to 
predominate this debate is the subject of the next Part. 
III.  HISTORICAL EXPRESSIONS OF THE COMPACT VIEW 
The compact view has long influenced the public understanding 
of the meaning of the Constitution.  It was instrumental in 
arguments advanced in order to deny constitutional protections to 
aliens and slaves.  Its influence can also be observed in Supreme 
Court jurisprudence acquiescing in the exercise of federal powers 
that exceed the scope of powers delegated by the text.  This is not to 
say that the Supreme Court is disinclined to place limits on the 
scope of federal sovereignty.  However, when the Court has curbed 
the scope of federal power, it has typically been in the context of 
domestic controversies and in a manner that places the residual 
sovereignty withdrawn from the federal government into the hands 
of state governments rather than those of the people.  Meanwhile, 
the compact view has often been invoked to support an expansive 
scope of federal power in the areas of immigration and foreign 
affairs—instances when state interests are rarely directly at stake. 
A. The Framers and the Compact View 
The origins of the compact view of governmental authority can 
be traced to the search for a replacement for monarchy by political 
thinkers in England and its colonies during the Enlightenment.  By 
the early eighteenth century, absolutism as the basis for the 
authority of the English Crown had been undermined by the facts of 
the Glorious Revolution of 1688 and the Hanoverian reaccession to 
 121. See GORDON S. WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 
187 (1992) (noting that the American conception of republican government 
viewed state legislatures as “sovereign embodiments of the people with a 
responsibility to promote a unitary public interest that was to be clearly 
distinguishable from the many private interests of the society”).  There are 
countless examples of the Framers’ recognition that the rights embodied in the 
Constitution are an expression of the universal rights enjoyed by all 
humankind.  For example, John Adams wrote: “That all men are born to equal 
rights is true.  Every being has a right to his own, as clear, as moral, as sacred, 
as any other being has.”  Letter from John Adams to John Taylor (1814), in THE 
AMERICAN ENLIGHTENMENT, supra note 66, at 221, 222. 
 122. See, e.g., CORNELL, supra note 74, at 303–07. 
 123. See READ, supra note 14, at 169–71. 
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the throne.124  The American colonists, in particular, had begun to 
think about the source of government authority in new ways that 
sought to replace the patriarchal relationship between the Crown 
and its subjects with a political philosophy that recognized a role for 
the consent of the governed.125  Traditional notions of sovereignty 
that had long viewed the king as a paternalistic father figure began 
to give way to the idea of sovereignty as a contract between the king 
and his people.126
The nature of any contract is to impose commensurate 
obligations on both parties.  Colonists who lived in an increasingly 
commercialized world easily adapted the notion of commercial 
contracts to the political arena.127  The colonists’ experience with 
commercial contracts acculturated them to the idea that positive 
bargains could be “deliberately and freely entered into between two 
parties who were presumed to be equal and not entirely trustful of 
one another.”128  It was a natural evolution to come to view the 
relationship between the people of a nation and their government in 
similar terms.129
The colonists began to believe that, even in a monarchy, the 
Crown and its subjects owe each other commensurate obligations.  
The Crown owes an obligation to its subjects to protect them from 
external harms and, in return, the subjects owe the Crown their 
loyalty.130  Colonists aggrieved by the arbitrary dictates of a distant 
 124. See WOOD, supra note 121, at 155–56. 
 125. MCAFFEE, BYBEE & BRYANT, supra note 15, at 5–6. 
 126. Id. 
 127. See NEWMYER, supra note 24, at 211 (“The line between public and 
private law in early national jurisprudence was plainly imprecise.  So was the 
distinction between private entrepreneurial activity and public welfare, at least 
in the economically-grounded, common- law-infused constitutional 
jurisprudence of [John Marshall].”). 
 128. See WOOD, supra note 121, at 162. 
 129. The compact view also displays the influence of the method of biblical 
interpretation that views the Bible as a compact between God and a chosen 
people.  See MCAFFEE, BYBEE & BRYANT, supra note 15, at 3 (“The use of 
covenants to establish civil governments melded the early colonists’ religious 
and legal traditions.”).  The Puritan familiarity with the concept of covenants 
undoubtedly contributed to the ease with which the colonists in New England 
accepted a view of governmental authority premised on contractual terms.  See 
WOOD, supra note 121, at 163.  Covenants described the relationship between 
people and God, between congregations and ministers, and between members of 
a religious community, so in a sense the compact view merely placed secular 
authority on the same doctrinal footing as moral authority.  Id.  After 
independence, economic forces built on this religious foundation.  The need to 
clarify and formalize conflicting titles to land, as well as the desire to protect 
nationwide markets from localized government protectionism, meant that 
“contract thinking derivative from private law . . . insinuated its way into 
constitutional discourse as the chief protector of property rights.”  NEWMYER, 
supra note 24, at 242; accord id. at 264–66 (discussing the influences on John 
Marshall’s contract law jurisprudence). 
 130. In 1774, James Wilson wrote that “protection and allegiance are the 
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king began to view themselves as “parties to contracts, deliberative 
agreements, legal or mercantile in character, between people and 
rulers in which allegiance and protection were the considerations.”131  
Indeed, the moral justification for the rebellion against the Crown 
that became the American Revolution was that by failing to live up 
to its obligations toward the American colonies the Crown had 
forfeited any right to expect their allegiance or loyalty.132
The compact view adopts these influences and assumes a purely 
contractual source of governmental authority.  As applied to the 
U.S. Constitution, the compact theory posits a “Genesis story” that 
explains the creation of our nation.  The story holds that the text of 
the Constitution was created as an agreement among individual 
sovereign states and that the language of the document embodies 
the terms of that agreement.133  Therefore, the parties to the 
contract (the several states) remain the repository of any powers not 
granted to the federal government by the text. 
It is well understood that, in the debate over the ratification of 
reciprocal bonds, which connect the prince and his subjects.”  James Wilson, 
Considerations on the Nature and Extent of the Legislative Authority of the 
British Parliament, in 2 THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 721, 743 (Robert Green 
McCloskey ed., 1967).  Wilson then wrote: “Allegiance to the king and obedience 
to the parliament are founded on very different principles.  The former is 
founded on protection: the latter, on representation.”  Id. at 736–37. 
 131. WOOD, supra note 121, at 165. 
 132. MCAFFEE, BYBEE & BRYANT, supra note 15, at 6–8. 
 133. See, e.g., U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 846 (1995) 
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (“The ultimate source of the Constitution’s authority is 
the consent of the people of each individual State, not the consent of the 
undifferentiated people of the Nation as a whole.”).  The “Genesis story” 
expounded by adherents to the compact view begins with the assumption that 
the Framers of the Constitution relied heavily upon the social theories of John 
Locke.  See, e.g., FORREST MCDONALD, STATES’ RIGHTS AND THE UNION 7 (2000).  
The Framers, therefore, would have expected that “the compact that establishes 
and legitimizes a political society is between a prince or governing body and the 
people,” and that only the failure of the compact returns the sovereign power to 
the people who are then free to reconstitute a government.  Id.  After the 
American Revolution, the thirteen former colonies were established as new 
sovereigns by the popular consent of the people, and were authorized to exercise 
any power not expressly forbidden by their state constitutions.  Id. at 8.  The 
U.S. Constitution is therefore a compact between separate state sovereigns, 
representing the people of separate societies.  Id. at 9.  The grant of power to 
the federal government contained in the Constitution does not originate directly 
in the people, because all thirteen state sovereigns were still in existence at the 
time of ratification and the compact between the states and their residents had 
never been dissolved into the state of nature that is necessary under Lockean 
principles to return sovereignty to the people.  Id.  In sum, under the compact 
view, the U.S. Constitution is a federal act performed by the several states and 
not a national act performed by individuals comprising the entire nation.  Id. at 
19.  Luther Martin, who voted against adoption of the Constitution at the 
Constitutional Convention, expressed this understanding of the document as 
one of his reasons for opposing ratification.  See CORNELL, supra note 74, at 61–
62. 
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the Constitution, those who advocated for the creation of a truly 
national federal government prevailed over those who advocated for 
more localized state power.  However, the act of ratification itself did 
little to assuage the efforts of the Constitution’s opponents.  
Prominent voices continued to be raised in support of structural 
changes to the Constitution that would elevate state power over its 
nationalist focus.134  When these structural changes were not 
forthcoming, the opponents of nationalism switched gears: instead of 
arguing that the constitutional text needed structural changes, they 
argued that the text in its existing form should be interpreted as a 
compact between the states.135
Because individual persons are not a party to the agreement, 
the compact view does not preserve any meaningful residual power 
in the hands of the people.  Under this view, “the people” are the 
beneficiaries of the individual rights guaranteed by the Constitution 
but are otherwise spectators (albeit interested ones) at the 
bargaining table between the states and the federal government.136  
One early example of the compact view being asserted in order to 
interpret the Constitution took place during the debate over the 
congressional statutes known as the Alien and Sedition Acts. 
B. The Alien and Sedition Acts 
Under the administration of John Adams, the Federalists, who 
had shepherded the nation from monarchy to independence under a 
banner exalting the rights of man, had degenerated by 1798 into a 
political movement that was premised on two main articles of faith.  
First, the Federalists adopted measures that reflected a 
fundamental fear of the people and a distrust of democracy as being 
incompatible with order and security.137  Second, the Federalists 
firmly believed that opposition to their policies was premised on, 
and indistinguishable from, opposition to the Constitution.138  When 
 134. See NEWMYER, supra note 24, at 103 (“What Jefferson and Madison said 
in the [Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions]—what Marshall heard with alarm—
was that the Constitution was a contract created by sovereign states and that 
disputes over its meaning should be settled by those states and not the 
Supreme Court.”). 
 135. Id. at 105. 
 136. Some Federalists took this argument to its logical extreme and denied 
that the Constitution had any applicability to residents of the District of 
Columbia or the territories.  See NEUMAN, supra note 12, at 73–76. 
 137. JOHN C. MILLER, CRISIS IN FREEDOM 10 (1951). 
 138. Id. at 11.  Federalist policy was motivated to a very great extent by 
political considerations.  As summarized by James Morton Smith: 
Under the guise of patriotic purpose and internal security, the 
Federalists enacted a program designed to cripple, if not destroy, the 
Jeffersonian party.  In the face of the emergence of an effective grass-
roots democratic opposition to their domestic and foreign policies, they 
retreated to repression as a means of retaining political power.  The 
authoritarian alien and sedition system was the logical culmination of 
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tensions with France created the very real prospect of war, the 
Federalists reacted in a way that reflected these two basic premises.  
Congress passed, and President Adams signed, the four pieces of 
legislation that have come to be known collectively as the Alien and 
Sedition Acts.139
Although all four laws engendered great controversy, the Alien 
Act in particular is illustrative of the development of the compact 
view of the Constitution.  Federalists defended the Alien Act by 
arguing that aliens had no rights under the Constitution, for the 
simple reason that they were not a part of “the people” who possess 
rights that the federal government was obligated to recognize.  
Timothy Pickering, the Secretary of State under President Adams, 
expressed this view when he stated that “he must be ignorant 
indeed who does not know that the Constitution was established for 
the protection and security of American citizens, and not of 
intriguing foreigners.”140  Harrison Gray Otis, one of the leading 
Federalists in the House of Representatives, argued that when the 
drafters of the Preamble of the Constitution made reference to “[w]e, 
the people,” they were referring to a discrete community of 
individuals who were parties to that document.141  This community 
did not include aliens who had yet to attain citizenship.  Therefore, 
“[s]ince [the Constitution] was not made for the benefit of aliens, 
they could not claim equal rights and privileges with American 
citizens.”142  These arguments clearly reflect the view of the 
Constitution as a “compact” that only creates rights enforceable by 
the parties to the agreement.143
Federalist political philosophy. 
JAMES MORTON SMITH, FREEDOM’S FETTERS 21 (1956). 
 139. The Naturalization Act of 1798 was intended to reduce the growing 
strength of the foreign-born vote, most of which was in support of Republican 
candidates, by raising the probationary period for citizenship from five to 
fourteen years.  MILLER, supra note 137, at 47.  The Act Respecting Enemy 
Aliens, passed on July 6, 1798, was a war measure, granting the power to the 
President to remove citizens of enemy nations from the United States in times 
of war or threatened invasion.  Id. at 50.  The Alien Act, passed on June 25, 
1798, was directed at alien subversives whether or not the nation was at war 
and without regard to whether they were citizens of an enemy or friendly 
nation.  Id. at 51–52.  This Act granted the President the power to deport any 
alien suspected of engaging in subversive activities.  Id.  Finally, the Sedition 
Act of July 14, 1798 made it a crime to write, print, or speak in an attempt to 
weaken or defame the government and laws of the United States.  Id. at 66–71.  
While the Naturalization Act and the Alien Act were attempts to muzzle the 
Republican newspapers, many of which were founded and operated by recent 
immigrants, the Sedition Act was intended by Federalists to strike at political 
opposition by citizens as well as aliens.  Id. at 69. 
 140. MILLER, supra note 137, at 164. 
 141. SMITH, supra note 138, at 86. 
 142. Id. 
 143. See DANIEL KANSTROOM, DEPORTATION NATION 59 (2007); NEUMAN, 
supra note 12, at 54. 
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Opponents of the Alien Act premised their opposition on the 
lack of any delegation of power to the Congress to legislate on the 
right of aliens to reside within the country.144  The Constitution did 
not delegate a power to Congress to expel aliens any more than it 
delegated a power to expel natives.145  While the states might pass 
laws governing the terms of residence by aliens, Congress could 
not.146  The fact that Congress was acting against noncitizens did not 
save an unconstitutional attempt to exercise a nondelegated 
power.147  Republican critics of the law also rejected the argument 
that the Constitution applied only to citizens.  Representative 
Edward Livingstone of New York argued forcefully that the text of 
the document referred to rights possessed by “persons,” thus failing 
to distinguish between citizens and aliens, and that the courts had 
uniformly read the Constitution in this manner.148
The Alien Act is significant in our nation’s constitutional history 
with regard to the conceptualization of the Constitution as a 
compact.  First, Federalist advocates of centralized federal 
government power resorted to contractual analogies in order to 
justify their suspicion of immigrants.  Second, it is also notable that 
this early expression of the compact view was made in conjunction 
with the assertion that the federal government possessed inherent 
powers of self-preservation that were not expressed in the 
constitutional text.  This interconnection between the compact view, 
the assertion of the rights of immigrants, and the justification of a 
nontextual inherent power is a persistent theme in our nation’s 
history.149
 144. KANSTROOM, supra note 143, at 57; NEUMAN, supra note 12, at 68. 
 145. James Madison characterized the power to decide whether to permit 
the continued residence of natives and aliens alike as “a right originally 
possessed, and never surrendered, by the respective States.”  Madison, supra 
note 76, at 516.  Federalists, in contrast, believed that the distinction between 
natives and aliens was important.  At least insofar as it was directed at 
noncitizens, the Alien Act was said by Federalists to fall within the implied and 
inherent power of the federal government to defend the country against “foreign 
aggression.”  MILLER, supra note 137, at 164. 
 146. KANSTROOM, supra note 143, at 57; SMITH, supra note 138, at 71. 
 147. SMITH, supra note 138, at 72. 
 148. Id. at 87.  The Sedition Act eventually expired under its own terms 
without being subjected to a constitutional challenge in the Supreme Court 
(although the Court would later characterize the Sedition Act in terms that 
suggested it was unconstitutional).  See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 
U.S. 254, 276 (1964) (“Although the Sedition Act was never tested in this Court, 
the attack upon its validity has carried the day in the court of history.”).  The 
Alien Act expired on June 25, 1800.  The Naturalization Act has been amended 
and superseded countless times since 1798.  Alone among the four statutes 
passed in 1798, the Enemy Aliens Act persists as a part of the United States 
Code.  50 U.S.C. §§ 21–24 (2006). 
 149. Ironically, Republican opponents of the Alien and Sedition Acts 
responded to the threat of a centralized federal authority by advancing their 
own contractual analogy.  Republicans began to assert a “states’ rights” version 
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C. Supreme Court Assimilation of the Compact View 
1. Utility of Compact View in the Defense of Slavery 
The Supreme Court fully embraced the compact view in the case 
of Scott v. Sandford (“Dred Scott”).150  The rationale of Dred Scott is 
a direct result of the Supreme Court’s attempt to permanently 
preserve slavery despite the fact that the Constitution scrupulously 
avoided choosing sides on the issue.  The Court’s decision, holding 
that slaves were not “persons” under the meaning of the 
Constitution, claimed to do no more than give effect to the intent of 
the Framers.151  However, the Constitution dealt with the question 
of slavery by leaving the institution for states to adopt or reject 
under state law as a matter of federalism.152  This was the 
compromise necessary to get the Constitution adopted.153  The 
historical record does not support any specific intention on the part 
of the Framers to exclude slaves from the definition of “people.” 
The acceptance of slavery at the time of ratification offers no 
support for the argument that the word “persons” in the 
Constitution has anything less than universal application.  To the 
contrary, the failure to prohibit slavery actually supports a limited 
of the compact view that maintained that the true parties to any constitutional 
agreement were the people acting through the medium of their state 
governments, a theory that reflected Republican distrust of excessive federal 
power.  See CORNELL, supra note 74, at 238–39.  Saul Cornell summarizes this 
“states’ rights” response to the Alien and Sedition Acts as follows: 
Jefferson and Madison asserted that the protection of individual 
liberty depended upon preserving the balance of power between the 
states and the federal government.  States’ rights and individual 
rights continued to be linked in opposition constitutional discourse.  
[The Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions] also adopted the compact 
theory of federalism, in which the states were cast as the original 
parties of the compact that created the Union.  The people acting 
through the states had consented to alienate a portion of their power 
to the federal government for a limited set of objectives detailed by the 
Constitution.  The original parties to this compact, the states, were 
therefore entitled to judge infractions that violated the original 
contract. 
Id. at 240. 
By adopting a “states’ rights” version of the compact theory, Republicans 
incorporated some of the Anti-Federalist critique of the Constitution.  As an 
attempt to check the growing authority of the federal government, the 
Republicans’ rhetorical tactic had merit.  However, by accepting the validity of 
the contract analogy as a framework for constitutional interpretation, rather 
than repudiating it altogether, the Republicans perversely ended up 
strengthening the legitimacy of the compact view as a means of excluding 
“outsiders” from the protection of the constitutional text. 
 150.  60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857), superseded by constitutional amendment, 
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
 151. Id. at 404–05.
 152. See NEWMYER, supra note 24, at 424–25. 
 153. Id. 
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delegation of sovereign power to the federal government by “the 
people.”  The federal government never received the power to 
prohibit slavery.  It was left to the states to define whether their 
residents enjoyed equal protection under the law prior to the 
adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Constitution was 
expressly set up to preserve each state’s independent ability to 
decide this question.154  The original constitutional text is concerned 
with the power (and lack of power) of the federal government.155
The difficulty facing the majority of the Supreme Court in Dred 
Scott was that the Constitution did delegate to Congress the power 
to legislate for the territories.156  Therefore, while reliance on the 
delegation view might lead to the conclusion that the Constitution 
offered no protection to slaves residing in the southern states, the 
delegation view provided no basis for arguing that Congress lacked 
the power to prohibit slavery in the territories or to make the 
prohibition of slavery a condition for statehood.  Unless the majority 
interpreted the Constitution in a way that imposed such constraints 
on Congress, the southern states would become increasingly 
outnumbered by the ranks of “free states.” 
The solution to this dilemma, embraced by Chief Justice Taney 
and the rest of the majority, was to espouse a compact theory that 
was at odds with the traditional use of delegated powers as a means 
of defining the scope of federal power.  Justice Taney argued that 
the southern states would never have ratified the Constitution if the 
text required the federal government to treat slaves as “persons.”157  
This argument reduces the Constitution to a contract whose terms 
are to be defined in accord with the intentions of the parties, while 
ignoring the interests of nonparties to the agreement.158
After the Civil War, the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted in 
order to overturn the Dred Scott decision.159  The Fourteenth 
Amendment mandated equality of all persons under the law of the 
states, thereby fundamentally restructuring relations between 
federal and state governments.  States were no longer free to define 
who enjoyed equal treatment.  The sovereign “people” of the nation 
reclaimed from the states the broad authority that states previously 
wielded to discriminate among classes of state residents.  The 
Fourteenth Amendment definitively rejected the definition of 
personhood propounded in Dred Scott, and this rejection should 
have put the compact theory to rest.160  No longer could the 
 154. See id. at 434 (concluding that John Marshall’s theory of federalism 
“deferred to the states on the question of slavery”). 
 155. Barron v. Mayor & City Council of Balt., 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 247 
(1833). 
 156. Scott, 60 U.S. at 436.
 157. Id. at 416.
 158. See NEUMAN, supra note 12, at 61. 
 159. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
 160. Rejection of the compact theory does not threaten the continued vitality 
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Constitution be read as a contract between certain “persons” and the 
federal government, to the exclusion of others who were born within 
our borders. 
However, while it emphatically affirmed the equality of all of 
those born within our borders, the Fourteenth Amendment did not 
address or resolve the question of whether immigrants have 
constitutional rights coextensive with those of citizens.  Nor did it 
address whether coextensive treatment should turn on whether the 
immigrants entered our country lawfully or unlawfully.  In addition, 
the Fourteenth Amendment failed to address whether the federal 
government could deliberately undercut the promise of equality of 
the “persons” referenced in its text by purposefully and methodically 
ensuring that questionable government conduct take place on 
foreign soil.  Therefore, the addition of the Fourteenth Amendment 
to the Constitution left an opening for the compact theory to reinsert 
itself into the nation’s constitutional jurisprudence. 
2. Compact and Immigration Law 
a.  External Borders Define the Parties to the Compact.  The 
Supreme Court would inject the compact theory into its reading of 
the Constitution when it once again had the opportunity to consider 
of the “states’ rights” jurisprudence that was often the Supreme Court’s focal 
point during the term of Chief Justice Rehnquist.  Under Rehnquist, the 
Supreme Court developed a theory of states’ rights that combined a decreased 
emphasis on the Fourteenth Amendment’s structural changes with a textualist 
buildup of the content of the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments.  See Barnett, 
supra note 73, at 292–93.  Both aspects of this states’ rights approach explicitly 
rely on compact theory principles dating back to the Articles of Confederation in 
order to interpret the Constitution as a compact between the state and federal 
governments.  The intention of the Rehnquist Court was to recognize a broad 
sphere of state sovereignty that is immune from federal interference.  As a 
result of this line of cases, the compact theory and states’ rights jurisprudence 
have become mutually reinforcing. 
However, the Rehnquist Court’s states’-rights cases need not be seen as 
inconsistent with the delegation theory.  The federal government lacks power to 
legislate in certain fields simply because the text of the Constitution reserves 
certain sovereign powers to the states.  There is no need to go further and make 
analogies to a compact.  To do so, and to premise the existence of a limitation on 
federal power on the existence of a “contract” between the federal government 
and the states, is to ignore the fact that “the people” in their general capacity 
are also members of the “contract” (via the Tenth Amendment) and are 
therefore free to use their federal representatives to act on the states.  A better 
reading is simply to construe the Constitution as the source of all delegated 
powers that the federal government possesses.  The Fourteenth Amendment 
changes the original text by removing a power that the states had previously 
retained and by lodging a new power to police the states with the federal 
government.  After the Fourteenth Amendment, the states no longer possess 
the power to treat their residents unequally under the law, and the federal 
government is given the authority to enforce equality of treatment against 
offending states. 
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whether the Constitution provided any rights to “outsiders.”  This 
resurrection of the compact view occurred in the context of 
immigration law.  In 1889, the Court decided the seminal 
immigration law case commonly known as The Chinese Exclusion 
Case.161  Congress had passed a law barring the entry of Chinese 
nationals into the United States.  Chae Chan Ping, the plaintiff-
alien in the case, argued that Congress could not pass laws 
regulating the entry of noncitizens because the Constitution did not 
expressly grant such a power to Congress.162  The premise of his 
argument was that the Constitution leaves it to the individual 
states to regulate immigration of persons across their borders.163
The premise of the argument put forth by Chae Chan Ping was 
identical, therefore, to the delegation view of the Constitution put 
forth by the opponents of the Enemy Aliens Act.  Significantly, if 
Congress lacked the power to prohibit the entry of Chinese persons 
into our country, it would be irrelevant whether the person objecting 
to Congress’s authority was a noncitizen.  It would be equally 
irrelevant that the aggrieved person was physically located outside 
of our borders, seeking permission to enter.  However, in The 
Chinese Exclusion Case, the Supreme Court upheld the 
constitutionality of the statute barring Chae Chan Ping’s entry.164
Justice Field’s opinion for the Court’s majority held that 
Congress does indeed possess the power to exclude noncitizens from 
our borders.  Three possible interpretations of the Constitution 
(which is silent on the question of immigration) can be advanced to 
support his holding.  First, Justice Field explicitly argued that the 
locus of the federal government’s immigration power lies outside of 
the Constitution, in the sovereign power of nations.165  Obviously, 
this interpretation is problematic.  While occasionally invoked by 
the Supreme Court during its history,166 the idea that the federal 
government derives any authority from sources outside of the 
constitutional text has been criticized by legal scholars.167
 161. Chae Chan Ping v. United States (The Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 
U.S. 581 (1889). 
 162. Id. at 603.
 163. See generally Gerald L. Neuman, The Lost Century of Immigration Law 
(1776–1875), 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1833, 1841–84 (1993) (demonstrating that state 
laws served the function of regulating immigration during the first century of 
American independence). 
 164. The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. at 609.
 165. Id. at 604.
 166. See, e.g., United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318 
(1936) (observing that “the investment of the federal government with the 
powers of external sovereignty did not depend upon the affirmative grants of 
the Constitution”). 
 167. See, e.g., David M. Levitan, The Foreign Relations Power: An Analysis 
of Mr. Justice Sutherland’s Theory, 55 YALE L.J. 467, 489 (1946) (“Certainly 
institutions operating in crisis situations may be forced to exercise powers 
beyond their announced authority.  That, however, would not support a 
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Second, Justice Field suggested that the Constitution contains 
an “implied” delegation of foreign affairs power to the federal 
government, and that immigration falls within the scope of this 
implied delegation.168  This second interpretation of the Constitution 
is similarly problematic.  Even if a “foreign affairs power” might be 
implied from the structure of the constitutional text to reside in the 
federal government, the most logical recipient of a foreign affairs 
power would be the executive branch, rather than Congress.169  Most 
of the responsibility for dealing with foreign nations is explicitly 
delegated by the Constitution to the federal government in the 
person of the President.170
However, there is a third possible interpretation of the 
Constitution lurking beneath Justice Field’s holding that Congress 
can pass the exclusion law at issue—albeit one that Justice Field 
himself does not articulate.  Arguably the compact view supports the 
exclusion law at issue in the Chinese Exclusion Case to a greater 
extent than do the first two rationales, because constitutional limits 
on government power do not apply to nonmembers.  Noncitizens 
located outside of our territory are simply not part of the bargain 
embodied by the constitutional text.  This third rationale employs 
territorial borders to define the members of the “community” who 
are entitled to avail themselves of the constitutional bargain. 
The possibility that the compact view provides an unexpressed 
rationale in The Chinese Exclusion Case was furthered in a 
subsequent case.  Fong Yue Ting v. United States171 extended and 
expanded on what has come to be called the “plenary power 
doctrine” in immigration law, a much-criticized exception to the 
prevailing view of constitutional limits on federal authority.  In that 
case, Congress passed a law providing for the deportation of Chinese 
nationals in the United States who could not establish their lawful 
presence.172  Just as the Constitution is silent as to whether 
Congress has the power to pass laws excluding foreigners, the 
Constitution is also silent as to whether Congress possesses the 
power to order the deportation of noncitizens within our borders.  
The opinion of the majority of the Court upheld the power of 
conclusion that it was the theory on which the institutions operated.”).  But see 
JOHN YOO, THE POWERS OF WAR AND PEACE 8–11 (2005) (arguing that the 
constitutional text reflects eighteenth century concepts of sovereign power, and, 
in doing so, justifying a theory of executive power that is derived from political 
philosophies external to the text). 
 168. The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. at 605. 
 169. Indeed, the very congressional statute that barred the plaintiff from 
entering the United States in the The Chinese Exclusion Case was passed in 
contravention of guaranteed rights of reentry that had been acceded to by the 
executive branch in a treaty with China. 
 170. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (granting the President the right to make 
treaties). 
 171. 149 U.S. 698 (1893). 
 172. See id. at 699 n.1. 
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Congress to pass deportation laws, relying on the first and second 
rationales expressed in Justice Field’s opinion in The Chinese 
Exclusion Case.173
Justice Field wrote a vigorous dissent in the Fong Yue Ting 
case.  In light of his prior opinion for the majority in The Chinese 
Exclusion Case, Justice Field’s refusal to join the majority in 
extending that case’s rationale to the deportation context seems 
anomalous.  Justice Field is clear that he fully stands by his two 
earlier assertions that the power to regulate immigration is, in fact, 
a legitimate extraconstitutional sovereign power, and, in any event, 
that the Constitution impliedly delegates the power to regulate 
immigration to the federal government as a type of “foreign 
affairs.”174  Why, then, does he draw a distinction between the 
congressional power to exclude and the congressional power to 
deport?175
Justice Field’s two opinions can be reconciled if he is, in fact, 
using the compact view as a filter through which to define the rights 
of aliens.  If the members of the “political community” entitled to 
assert the protections of the Constitution are defined on a territorial 
basis, then those immigrants who are present within U.S. borders 
are a part of the community in a way that those aliens outside of our 
borders are not.  The Constitution must leave it to the states to 
regulate the deportation of their residents, because the Constitution 
does not grant a deportation power to Congress.  Deportation, 
therefore, implicates questions of membership in the state that are 
not implicated by exclusion. 
The majority of the Court, however, chose to define the relevant 
community differently than did Justice Field.  The majority 
considered noncitizens to be present within our borders at the 
pleasure of Congress, and it denied the existence of any 
constitutional command for Congress to treat noncitizens fairly if 
they are to be expelled.176  For the majority, therefore, the presence 
of Fong Yue Ting within our borders was not presumptively 
sufficient to bring him within the constitutional compact.  
Significantly, however, the majority did not rely on a compact 
rationale in deciding the case.  Instead, the rationale of the Fong 
Yue Ting majority builds on the holding of The Chinese Exclusion 
Case to hold that the immigration power is founded on the sovereign 
 173. Id. at 705–07. 
 174. Id. at 745–46 (Field, J., dissenting). 
 175. It is also possible that Justice Field was operating under the 
assumption that the Constitution does not delegate any power to the federal 
government that is not sanctioned by international law.  Justice Field’s brother 
was the author of a well-known international law treatise that argued, among 
other things, that there was no right under international law for one nation to 
expel the citizens of another nation without special cause.  See KANSTROOM, 
supra note 143, at 97. 
 176. Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 731. 
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power of nations, with the result that it largely immunizes 
congressional statutes dealing with immigration matters from the 
standard judicial review that the Supreme Court otherwise applies 
to acts of Congress in order to ensure that statutes do not transgress 
the confines of the Constitution.177  As a result, fundamental 
questions of membership are left unanswered by these two 
immigration cases. 
b.  The Interior Remains Borderless.  During the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth century, the conflict between the delegation 
theory and the compact theory did not seem to play a major role in 
the Supreme Court’s interpretation of constitutional rights outside 
of the immigration context.  The Supreme Court advanced the view 
that all persons located within the United States, without regard to 
alienage or citizenship, had an equal claim to assert the individual 
rights guaranteed by the Constitution.178  The equality of rights 
promoted by the Court during this period can be justified under 
either a delegation lens or a compact lens.  Under a delegation view, 
the federal government lacks the power to infringe on the protected 
sphere of individual rights.  With the exception of matters relating 
to admission or expulsion of aliens, which were considered to fall 
within the plenary power doctrine, the compact view regarded all 
persons within the territory of the United States—whether citizen, 
lawful permanent resident, or illegal entrant—to be members of the 
community entitled to constitutional protection.  The congruence 
between the delegation view and the compact view during the 
nineteenth century was possible because the nation’s territorial 
boundary was assumed to mark the dividing line between members 
of the political community and those “outsiders” who lacked the 
ability to complain if Congress overstepped its bounds. 
The decision in Yick Wo v. Hopkins179 demonstrates the 
Supreme Court’s acceptance of the inclusive nature of the rights 
guaranteed to all individuals physically located within the national 
boundary.  The Court’s holding applied the command of equal 
protection under the law set forth in the Fourteenth Amendment to 
 177. This anomalous characteristic of immigration law has come to be 
known as the plenary power doctrine.  See, e.g., Nishimura Ekiu v. United 
States, 142 U.S. 651, 659 (1892) (“It is an accepted maxim of international law, 
that every sovereign nation has the power, as inherent in sovereignty, and 
essential to self-preservation, to forbid the entrance of foreigners within its 
dominions, or to admit them only in such cases and upon such conditions as it 
may see fit to prescribe.”). 
 178. See, e.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886) (“The 
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution is not confined to the protection of 
citizens . . . .  These provisions are universal in their application, to all persons 
within the territorial jurisdiction, without regard to any differences of race, of 
color, or of nationality; and the equal protection of the laws is a pledge of the 
protection of equal laws.”). 
 179. 118 U.S. 356 (1886). 
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strike down a state law that discriminated against noncitizens.180  
Similarly, in Yamataya v. Fisher, the Court held that the 
constitutional guarantee of due process applied to noncitizens 
present within our nation’s borders.181  In the case of Wong Wing v. 
United States,182 the Court took the clearest stand in support of this 
principle: 
[T]he Supreme Court in Wong Wing held that constitutional 
rights protected unlawfully present aliens even against the 
exercise of Congress’ power to control immigration.  For the 
first time in its history, the Court expressly invalidated a 
federal statute for violating the constitutional rights of an 
alien.  And it did so despite the government’s argument that 
unlawfully present aliens should not be recognized as 
possessing constitutional rights.183
Until World War II, therefore, the principle that all persons 
located within our nation’s borders were entitled to equivalent 
rights appeared to be firmly established.184  The Court’s commitment 
to this principle would be called into question, however, as it moved 
to apply the compact view to limit the applicability of the 
Constitution within our nation’s interior. 
3. The Compact View Moves into the Interior 
As America entered the Cold War era, the Supreme Court 
decided a series of immigration cases that invoked the plenary 
power doctrine and that drew on the compact theory to deny the 
reach of the Constitution outside our borders.  These Cold War cases 
made clear that the underlying rationale beneath the plenary power 
doctrine was not judicial deference to Congress’s exercise of an 
implied foreign affairs power, but instead the more aggressive 
assertion that the federal government possesses the unbounded 
power to take any action that it chooses against nonmembers of the 
compact.  For example, in United States ex rel. Knauff v. 
Shaughnessy, the Court ruled that the German bride of an 
American soldier could be prevented from making her initial entry 
 180. Id. at 369. 
 181. Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86, 100–01 (1903). 
 182. 163 U.S. 228 (1896). 
 183. Gerald L. Neuman, Wong Wing v. United States: The Bill of Rights 
Protects Illegal Aliens, in IMMIGRATION STORIES 31, 40 (David A. Martin & Peter 
H. Schuck eds., 2005). 
 184. Even Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), which 
notoriously upheld the constitutionality of the internment of Japanese-
American citizens during World War II, accepted the premise that all persons 
within the territory of the United States are entitled to the protections of the 
Constitution.  Id. at 223–24.  The Korematsu Court was simply not brave 
enough, during wartime, to follow this premise to its logical conclusion and rule 
the internment unconstitutional. 
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into the country without any explanation and with virtually no 
opportunity to be heard.185  In Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. 
Mezei, the Court held that the same unfettered government power 
could be applied to prevent the reentry of a lawful resident alien of 
long standing who was returning from a trip abroad.186  These cases 
suggested that the federal government could take actions against 
persons outside of our borders who might well be considered to be 
members of the political community had they merely been present 
on U.S. soil. 
It is not surprising, therefore, that the rationale adopted in 
these Cold War immigration cases would be extended to exclude 
persons located within our borders from the “community” entitled to 
assert constitutional protection.187  This extension can be observed in 
cases that considered whether unlawful border crossers located 
within the United States were entitled to the same constitutional 
protections as citizens.  The same process can be seen in cases in 
which the Supreme Court has questioned whether even lawful 
immigrants within our borders should enjoy constitutional rights 
identical to those that citizens enjoy. 
a.  Unlawful Border Crossers.  In the second half of the 
twentieth century, the federal courts began to struggle with the 
question of whether illegal aliens subjected to state discrimination 
possessed constitutional rights.  The plenary power doctrine as it 
had developed in immigration cases was inapposite to the exercise of 
state power, and therefore the plenary power of Congress provided 
no support for the challenged state laws.  However, the Supreme 
Court was not willing to ignore the illegal status of alien residents 
when considering the extent to which the Constitution protected 
them.  The result was a series of cases in which illegal aliens 
received some constitutional protection from discriminatory state 
laws, but for reasons that were unclear.188  The Court’s struggle 
 185. United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 544 (1950) 
(“Whatever the procedure authorized by Congress is, it is due process as far as 
an alien denied entry is concerned.”). 
 186. Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212 (1953). 
 187. See Louis Henkin, The Constitution and United States Sovereignty: A 
Century of Chinese Exclusion and Its Progeny, 100 HARV. L. REV. 853, 862–63 
(1987) (criticizing the Supreme Court’s immigration and deportation rulings for 
ignoring the fundamental protections accorded by the Constitution).  Professor 
Henkin argued that the plenary power cases should be brought into the 
constitutional mainstream.  Id.  In fact, it is the mainstream that has been 
influenced by these outlier cases. 
 188. For example, the Supreme Court’s opinion in Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 
(1982) prevents states from denying public education to minor illegal aliens 
within our borders, but does not posit a convincing rationale.  Id. at 210.  
Accord Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 374–75 (1971) (holding that an 
alien “is a ‘person’ for equal protection purposes,” and extending to resident 
aliens the same public assistance benefits enjoyed by citizens). 
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reflects an unsuccessful attempt to integrate the extraconstitutional 
dimension of the plenary power doctrine within the normal 
constitutional framework.189
It is difficult to reconcile the lack of constitutional rights outside 
of the border with the guarantee of full constitutional protection 
within the border.  The reason for the Court’s struggle to maintain 
this distinction is that an illegal entrant has no greater moral or 
political status by virtue of evading a border checkpoint than he had 
when he stood outside of our borders.  Moreover, it seems 
incongruous to deny the existence of constitutional due process 
rights of lawful residents who seek to reenter the United States 
after a trip abroad, yet recognize that illegal entrants possess 
constitutional rights merely because they stand on U.S. soil.  When 
attempting to resolve this dilemma, the Supreme Court adopted the 
position that crossing into the territory of the United States in 
contravention of law grants the entrant some, but not all, of the 
protections of the Constitution.190
Nothing in the constitutional text supports the idea that 
different populations within our borders are entitled to different 
levels of constitutional protection.  However, practical necessity 
requires that the expansive federal power over immigration matters 
be maintained even while the justification provided for this power 
by the plenary power doctrine is increasingly exposed as bankrupt.  
Even though the props upholding absolute government power over 
the control of immigration have been exposed as unstable, they 
cannot be allowed to fall, and thus new theories were necessary in 
order to buttress the federal government’s immigration power.  An 
increasing reliance on the compact theory of the Constitution served 
this purpose, and allowed the broad power exercised by the 
government outside of our nation’s borders to reach illegal entrants 
living within our territory.191
In compact theory, persons who entered our country unlawfully 
enjoy the same status as persons who are physically located outside 
of the United States: neither group is part of the “community” that 
is part of the bargain with the federal government.  Because the 
plenary power doctrine is tied to extraconstitutional notions of 
sovereignty, it cannot grow to encompass legislation outside of the 
immigration context unless the Supreme Court were willing to adopt 
a very expansive view of the types of legal disputes that fall within 
the “immigration” field.  On the other hand, the compact theory of 
the Constitution has room to grow outside of the immigration 
context.  All that is necessary is to shift away from the territorial 
boundary as the exclusive determinant of who belongs to the 
 189. See Linda S. Bosniak, Membership, Equality and the Difference that 
Alienage Makes, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1047, 1137–41 (1994). 
 190. See supra note 188 and accompanying text.
 191. See supra note 187 and accompanying text.
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political community and instead to become more selective regarding 
the groups within our borders who qualify for membership. 
United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez,192 decided in 1990, made 
explicit the expansion of the compact view into the interior of our 
country.  The case involved a Mexican national who was transferred 
to U.S. custody by the Mexican government.193  While he was in 
custody in California, agents from the Drug Enforcement Agency 
searched his home in Mexico without a warrant.194  Mr. Verdugo-
Urquidez sought to have the results of the extraterritorial search 
suppressed on the grounds that his Fourth Amendment rights had 
been violated.195
Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote the opinion for the Court, 
although his reasoning was only fully adopted by three other 
Justices.  He concluded that the Fourth Amendment did not protect 
the defendant and that the search was lawful.196  He based this 
conclusion on the assertion that the words “the people” in the 
Fourth Amendment referred to a specific community of persons who 
possess cognizable ties to the United States.197  Chief Justice 
Rehnquist reasoned that aliens within our borders do not acquire 
full constitutional protection until they develop sufficiently 
demonstrable ties with the political community.198  Although his 
reasoning was intended to limit the reach of the Constitution to 
aliens outside of the United States199 who object to government 
conduct occurring outside of our borders, Rehnquist’s rationale 
applies equally to limit constitutional rights for illegal entrants 
inside the United States.  Therefore, the Verdugo-Urquidez decision 
raised the prospect that residents who are present in the United 
States in violation of the law can be excluded from “the people” who 
can claim the protections of the Constitution.200
The legislative and executive branches of the federal 
 192. 494 U.S. 259 (1990). 
 193. Id. at 262. 
 194. Id.
 195. Id. at 263.
 196. Id. at 274–75.
 197. Id. at 265.  The First, Second, Ninth, and Tenth Amendments also 
reference “the people.” 
 198. Id. at 271.
 199. Mr. Verdugo-Urquidez’s presence in the United States was involuntary, 
and did not confer any greater rights on him than he would have possessed had 
he remained in Mexico. 
 200. See, e.g., United States v. Gutierrez-Casada, 553 F. Supp. 2d 1259, 
1265–66 (D. Kan. 2008) (holding that an aggravated felon deported from the 
United States has no Fourth Amendment rights upon illegal reentry); United 
States v. Esparza-Mendoza, 265 F. Supp. 2d 1254, 1271 (D. Utah 2003) (holding 
that the Fourth Amendment does not apply to those illegally present in the 
United States), aff’d, 386 F.3d 953 (10th Cir. 2004).  But see United States v. 
Atienzo, No. 2:04-CR-00534 PGC, 2005 U.S. Dist. Lexis 31652, at *14–15 (D. 
Utah Dec. 6, 2005) (reading Esparza-Mendoza narrowly to apply only to alien 
felons who are illegally present in the United States). 
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government seem to have accepted the implications of the Verdugo-
Urquidez case.  In 1996, Congress amended the immigration laws to 
create expedited removal procedures at border crossings for aliens 
who lack proper documentation, procedures that operate to remove 
aliens under streamlined proceedings and without the benefit of a 
hearing.201  The 1996 legislation also granted the Attorney General 
the authority to expand the use of expedited procedures.202  In 2004, 
the Department of Homeland Security announced that it was doing 
just that.  The new policy permits the deportation of non-Mexican 
aliens apprehended inside the United States, without a hearing, so 
long as their apprehension occurred within one hundred miles of the 
U.S. border and less than fourteen days after the alien’s illegal entry 
into the country.203  In this manner, a lesser form of due process 
rights has migrated from the border to the interior.  It is no longer 
the location of the alien, but the illegal manner of his or her entry, 
that allows the federal government to act against the alien free from 
the full measure of restraints that the Constitution otherwise places 
on the exercise of government authority. 
b.  Lawful Border Crossers.  Even those who enter our borders 
lawfully can lose their membership status and therefore lose the 
protection of the Constitution.  Congress has adopted procedures 
such as mandatory detention prior to a hearing, expedited hearings, 
and limited judicial review—originally limited in application to 
illegal entrants—that are now regularly applied to lawful border 
crossers who commit a criminal violation after they enter the United 
States.204  In particular, Congress’s creation of the “aggravated 
felon” provisions of the immigration laws fostered the application of 
extraterritorial norms to lawful border crossers.205  These provisions 
operate to substantially reduce the procedural rights possessed by 
those who are deemed to fall within the perpetually expanding 
definition of an “aggravated felon.”  In rejecting constitutional 
challenges to these provisions, the Supreme Court has equated those 
who enter lawfully but subsequently commit a violation of the civil 
or criminal law with those who have entered our country illegally.206
The Court initially expressed some discomfort at this prospect 
 201. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
132, § 422, 110 Stat. 1214, 1270–72 (1996).
 202. Id. § 504, 110 Stat. at 1260–61. 
 203. See Fact Sheet: Arizona Border Control Initiative, U.S. DEP’T OF 
HOMELAND SEC. (Sept. 21, 2004), http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/releases/press 
_release_0520.shtm.
 204. KANSTROOM, supra note 143, at 10–12. 
 205. See id. at 227–28 (discussing the expanding definition of the 
“aggravated felon” category between 1988 and 1994). 
 206. Id. at 227–28 (“[T]here has been a recent expansion—deep onto U.S. 
soil—of internal deportation mechanisms that were originally envisioned as 
appropriate only at the border and points of entry.”). 
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when it decided the case of Zadvydas v. Davis207 in 2001.  Kestutis 
Zadvydas immigrated to the United States from a displaced persons 
camp at the age of eight.208  As a resident alien, he built a long 
criminal record ending with a cocaine distribution conviction that 
rendered him deportable after he finished serving his criminal 
sentence.209  However, given the circumstances of his birth, Mr. 
Zadvydas did not possess citizenship in any other country, and the 
United States was unable to identify a country willing to accept him.  
Although the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) provides that 
a removal order must be effectuated within ninety days, the INA 
also provides that the Attorney General can determine that certain 
aliens “may be detained beyond the removal period.”210  The 
government asserted that this provision allowed it to detain Mr. 
Zadvydas indefinitely while it continued in its fruitless efforts to 
identify a country willing to accept him.211  Mr. Zadvydas filed a writ 
of habeas corpus challenging his detention on the grounds that the 
Fifth Amendment did not permit the government to detain him for 
an indefinite period.212
Justice Breyer’s majority opinion held that it would raise 
constitutional concerns under the Fifth Amendment to interpret 
INA section 241(a)(6) as granting the Attorney General the power to 
indefinitely detain individuals who were not deemed to be either a 
danger to the community or a flight risk.213  The doctrine of 
substantive due process requires that government action to deprive 
an individual of liberty must have a purpose, and, in the absence of 
any country willing to accept Mr. Zadvydas, the government could 
not identify any purpose served by continued detention.  Justice 
Breyer strongly rejected the government’s argument that the Fifth 
Amendment’s constraints did not apply to government action 
directed against aliens residing within our borders, distinguishing 
precedent that denies constitutional protections to aliens as solely 
applicable to the situation of aliens who have not entered the 
territorial borders of the United States.214  Given the “constitutional 
problem” that would arise if the statute were interpreted to permit 
indefinite detention, Justice Breyer held that the language of INA § 
241(a)(6) should be read to authorize detention beyond ninety days 
only so long as the removal of the alien is “reasonably 
foreseeable.”215
 207. 533 U.S. 678 (2001). 
 208. Id. at 684. 
 209. Id. 
 210. Id. at 706 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) 
(Supp. V 1994)). 
 211. Id. at 689 (majority opinion). 
 212. Id. at 686. 
 213. Id. at 690. 
 214. Id. at 690–96. 
 215. Id. at 701. 
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Justice Scalia dissented.  He viewed Mr. Zadvydas’s situation 
through the lens of the compact view.  Under this view, once an 
alien is convicted of a crime and becomes deportable as a 
consequence, that alien is no longer part of the community of “the 
people.”216  Instead, such an alien stands in the exact same relation 
to the United States as does an alien outside of our borders.  The 
result is that Mr. Zadvydas, even though he stood on U.S. soil, was 
simply beyond the reach of the United States Constitution.  
Therefore, under Justice Scalia’s reasoning, Congress was perfectly 
free to grant the Attorney General the power to order Mr. Zadvydas 
to be detained for years, decades, or until he dies.217
When the Supreme Court next considered the due process 
rights of noncitizens, in the case of Demore v. Kim,218 the Court 
limited the holding of Zadvydas to the point of nonexistence.  Mr. 
Kim immigrated to the United States from Korea at the age of six 
and became a permanent resident alien.  As an adult, he was 
convicted of burglary and petty theft.219  These convictions fell 
within the definition of “aggravated felonies,” and in INA section 
236, Congress provided that all aliens convicted of aggravated 
felonies must be taken into custody and detained during the 
pendency of their removal hearings.220  Mr. Kim challenged his 
detention under the doctrine of substantive due process.  He argued 
 216. Id. at 702–03 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 217. While written in broad language that clearly invoked constitutional 
concerns as a backdrop for the Court’s interpretation of INA § 241(a)(6), the 
majority in Zadvydas was careful to cast its opinion as a matter of statutory 
interpretation.  The Court would later be asked to construe the applicability of 
INA § 241(a)(6) in the context of aliens being detained as inadmissible at the 
border.  In Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371 (2005), Justice Scalia wrote a 
majority opinion in which he delighted in interpreting the statutory language to 
require that new arrivals with no connection to the United States be given the 
same relief from indefinite detention as aliens detained in removal proceedings 
who have longstanding ties to this country.  Id. at 378.  Justice Scalia argued 
that consistency in construing the statutory language requires a parallel 
interpretation.  In his view, the “absurd” result of forcing the government to set 
loose illegal entrants pending their removal hearing if they cannot be removed 
within ninety days merely underscores the mistake the majority made in 
Zadvydas when it interpreted the statute to grant noncitizens rights that 
approach those accorded to “the people” by the Constitution.  Id. at 378–79.  
Noncitizens outside of the border can often make claims of membership that are 
equally as compelling as the claims of noncitizens within the border.  In Scalia’s 
view, the fact that aliens outside of our borders cannot be considered members 
of the community governed by the Constitution dictates that aliens within our 
borders must also be outside of the national compact (at least once they commit 
a criminal offense that renders them deportable).  If the Zadvydas majority has 
foolishly construed the statute to treat deportable aliens as members of the 
compact, then it has no choice but to accept the consequence that the statutory 
language accords equal treatment to aliens detained at the border.  Id. 
 218. 538 U.S. 510 (2003). 
 219. Id. at 513. 
 220. See id. at 513–14. 
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that the federal government had to have reason to detain him while 
he awaited his deportation hearing.221  If he could show that he was 
not a flight risk, nor a danger to the community, then the Fifth 
Amendment required that he be released on bond until his hearing 
date. 
In an opinion by Justice Rehnquist, the Supreme Court 
disagreed.  Significantly, Justice Rehnquist’s opinion treated Mr. 
Kim as having “conceded” his deportability.222  Therefore, the only 
true issue was the discretion of the government in adopting 
procedures to effectuate his eventual removal.  In the view of the 
majority, mandating the detention of whole categories of persons 
during this process did not implicate constitutional concerns because 
these persons had already ceased to be part of the national 
compact.223  The Fifth Amendment simply placed no constraints on 
the procedures that Congress chose to employ.  Justice Rehnquist’s 
majority opinion adopts the same compact view of the Constitution 
as did Justice Scalia’s dissent in Zadvydas. 
The dissenters in Kim did not agree that Mr. Kim had conceded 
his deportability, and therefore they did not view him as having 
forfeited the protection of the Constitution.  Even conceding that Mr. 
Kim had no defense to his ultimate removal from the country, the 
discussion of the Fifth Amendment in the Zadvydas case led the 
dissenters to argue that all governmental restrictions on the 
individual liberty of noncitizens must have a purpose.224  However, 
the argument that the Constitution governs all government action 
within our borders, without regard to the identity of the individual 
subjected to that action, was unavailing.  The majority opinion 
avoided the implications of Zadvydas by limiting that case to the 
situation of an alien who is detained after the entry of a removal 
order and whose removal is no longer practically attainable.  Very 
few cases will arise within this limited factual context. 
The Supreme Court’s treatment of the alien in Kim serves to 
strengthen the application of the “compact” view within our borders.  
The Court’s decision suggests that a noncitizen who entered the 
country lawfully, but then commits a crime not only suffers the legal 
consequence of deportation but also loses any claim to be a member 
of the nation’s political community.  The alien’s criminal conviction 
(in conjunction with the fact that Congress has declared that those 
convicted of “aggravated felonies” are automatically deportable) is 
sufficient to justify treating the alien as an “outsider” with no 
greater constitutional rights than those afforded to a foreigner 
abroad.225  Mr. Kim’s criminal conviction acted to expel him from the 
 221. Id. at 522–23. 
 222. Id. at 531. 
 223. Id. at 522. 
 224. Id. at 541 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 225. While the opinions in both Zadvydas and Kim frame their holdings as 
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community of “the people.”  He therefore lost the right to demand 
that the federal government act in compliance with the limits 
imposed on it by the substantive due process clause of the Fifth 
Amendment.226
Congress can presumably identify whole categories of 
individuals and declare that they are no longer in privity with the 
federal government.  For example, the Kim case implies that 
engaging in conduct defined as constituting an “aggravated felony” 
terminates an alien’s membership in the constitutional compact.  
Once excluded from the compact, an individual loses the ability to 
use the Constitution to protect himself from government action.  Of 
course, if Congress can create one legal category that terminates 
membership in the constitutional compact, then Congress can create 
two, three, or a dozen other legal categories that can be applied with 
similar effect.  The majority in the Kim case was apparently 
untroubled by the prospect that Congress might abuse this power. 
D. Contemporary Executive Branch Expression of the Compact 
View: The Unitary Executive 
Questions of national security, like efforts to control the flow of 
immigrants, provide a fertile ground for compact-based theories of 
constitutional interpretation.  It is unsurprising, therefore, that the 
compact theory underlies the “theory of the unitary executive,” the 
primary legal justification put forth by the Bush administration to 
support its expansive exercise of executive branch power in response 
to the threat of terrorism.  A brief summary of Bush administration 
policies is necessary in order to illustrate this connection. 
The first legislative response to the attacks of September 11, 
2001 was the Authorization for Use of Military Force (“AUMF”).227  
Under the terms of the AUMF, Congress authorized the President 
“to use all necessary and appropriate force” against those 
responsible for the September 11 attacks and anyone harboring 
those individuals.228  President Bush invoked the AUMF when he 
issued a military order providing for the detention and treatment of 
individuals taken into custody as a result of the United States’ 
response to the terrorist attack, and providing for the use of military 
commissions to hold trials and determine punishments.229  Although 
interpretations of congressional statutes, the Court has a history of using 
statutory analysis as a surrogate for constitutional interpretation in 
immigration cases.  See Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of 
Plenary Power: Phantom Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 
100 YALE L.J. 545, 560–64 (1990). 
 226. See DAVID COLE, ENEMY ALIENS 224 (2003) (noting the difference in the 
due process rights accorded to foreign nationals within our borders). 
 227. Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 
224 (2001). 
 228. Id. § 2(a), 115 Stat. at 224. 
 229. Military Order of Nov. 13, 2001, Detention, Treatment, and Trial of 
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the original order did not use the phrase, the Bush administration 
adopted the term “unlawful enemy combatant” to refer to those 
individuals taken into custody by the United States government as 
part of the “War on Terror.”230
Although the concept of “preventative detention” is alien to our 
Constitution, the legal rationale used to justify the creation of the 
military commissions was that an unlawful enemy combatant had 
no rights under the United States Constitution.231  These individuals 
could be held and interrogated for however long the government 
considered them to either possess useful intelligence or pose a future 
threat to the United States.  In addition, persons designated as 
unlawful enemy combatants would not receive the procedural 
safeguards applicable to trials conducted in federal court, nor would 
such persons be entitled to claim the international law protections 
afforded to prisoners of war.  The creation of the category of 
“unlawful enemy combatant” removed a whole category of 
individuals from the legal protections that would normally allow a 
person to challenge the circumstances of his detention.232
Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 
13, 2001). 
 230. See Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 3, 120 
Stat. 2600, 2601.
 231. In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004), the Supreme Court ruled 
that U.S. citizen-detainees have a constitutional due process right to challenge 
their designation as an “unlawful enemy combatant.”  Id. at 533.  In response to 
this decision, the Department of Defense established bodies called Combatant 
Status Review Tribunals (“CSRT”) that were intended to hear challenges to 
enemy combatant designations by all detainees, whether citizens or not.  In 
Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008), the Supreme Court held that 
noncitizen detainees have the right of habeas corpus to challenge their 
detention in federal court, notwithstanding the provisions of the Military 
Commissions Act limiting the jurisdiction of the federal courts, and that the 
CSRT procedures were not an adequate substitute for habeas corpus 
proceedings.  Id. at 2262–63.  By focusing on the content of the right of habeas 
corpus under the Constitution, the Court avoided consideration of whether 
noncitizen detainees possessed the constitutional right of due process.  See id. 
at 2279 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).  Therefore, the extent to which the 
Constitution grants noncitizen detainees any rights beyond habeas corpus 
remains undecided to this day. 
 232. In this regard, the usage of the category of “unlawful enemy combatant” 
mirrored the way in which the similarly elastic category of “aggravated felon” 
came to be employed under the immigration laws.  See supra notes 205–06 and 
accompanying text.  Unlike with “aggravated felons,” however, the category of 
“unlawful enemy combatant” has the potential to include citizens as well as 
noncitizens.  See YOO, supra note 85, at 131.  The Bush administration 
originally sought to subject U.S. citizens Yasser Hamdi and Jose Padilla to the 
military tribunal process, before retreating in the face of adverse judicial 
rulings.  See COLE, supra note 226, at 3–4, 43–45.  While employed by the Office 
of Legal Counsel, John Yoo made the argument that American citizens working 
for the enemy could be treated under the Constitution as unlawful enemy 
combatants, but his superiors in the Bush administration made the policy 
decision to use either the criminal courts or the military courts martial in order 
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The Bush administration saw its system for detaining unlawful 
enemy combatants as essential to the exercise of an unfettered 
choice of interrogation methods.  In the name of obtaining 
intelligence in order to prevent future attacks on U.S. soil, the Bush 
administration authorized a wide range of coercive interrogation 
tactics: sleep deprivation; stress positions; extended exposure to 
extreme heat and cold; threatened attacks by dogs; injections of 
intravenous fluid while barring detainees from using the bathroom 
so that they urinate on themselves; and, most notoriously, 
waterboarding—a practice in which the suspect is tied to a bench, 
immersed in water, and made to feel that he is drowning.233  Many 
observers have since argued that these interrogation methods 
violated the United States’ treaty obligations under the Convention 
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, and Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment (“CAT”).234  This Convention, ratified by 
Congress in 1990, prohibits the use of torture under all 
circumstances.235
to conduct trials of U.S. citizens, rather than the military commissions that 
were conducting trials of Guantanamo detainees designated as unlawful enemy 
combatants.  See YOO, supra note 85, at 143–44; see also al-Marri v. Pucciarelli, 
534 F.3d 213, 216 (4th Cir. 2008), vacated sub nom. al-Marri v. Spagone, 129 
U.S. 1545 (2009).  It is troubling to consider that the existence or nonexistence 
of the constitutional procedural rights of citizens might be determined by the 
policy decisions of future Presidents.  It is doubtful that the Constitution was 
intended to place so much power over the rights of citizens in the hands of the 
executive.  Cf. KANSTROOM, supra note 143, at 18 (“Citizens . . . may be 
transformed into foreigners in order to be ostracized and banished.”). 
 233. Under the same preventative rationale, the Bush administration also 
“disappeared” certain “high-value” suspects into “black sites” operated by the 
Central Intelligence Agency (“CIA”)—“a series of prisons in undisclosed 
locations where the government’s conduct [could not] be monitored and [where] 
the suspect [was] completely cut off from the outside world.”  DAVID COLE & 
JULES LOBEL, LESS SAFE, LESS FREE 3 (2007).  In other instances, when these 
secret detention centers and coercive methods were not deemed sufficient, the 
Bush administration “rendered” suspects to be interrogated by agents of foreign 
governments that possessed even fewer scruples about their methods.  Id. 
 234. See, e.g., id. at 34–36.  For a defense of the legality of these 
interrogation methods, see YOO, supra note 85, at 165–203.  For criticism of 
Yoo’s reasoning, see COLE & LOBEL, supra note 233, at 56–57.  For an argument 
that customary international law is not binding on the President, see YOO, 
supra note 167, at 171–72. 
 235. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, and Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment arts. 1–7, Dec. 10, 1984, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-20, 
1465 U.N.T.S. 85.  The universality of the CAT prohibition on torture would 
seem to be beyond doubt.  See COLE & LOBEL, supra note 233, at 55.  However, 
the Bush administration advanced its own interpretation of the CAT that gave 
it a less than universal scope.  During the confirmation hearings for Alberto 
Gonzales, following his nomination as Attorney General, the question of the 
applicability of the CAT to the Bush administration’s interrogation practices 
arose.  During those hearings, Gonzales expressed the view that the CAT did 
not apply to the situation of foreign nationals outside of United States.  Id. at 
35; see also Opposition Statement, Human Rights First, Human Rights First 
W05_FALLONE 10/18/2010  11:45:59 AM 
1114 WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45 
 
In addition to its detention policies, the Bush administration 
also responded to the September 11 attacks by embarking on an 
effort to gather intelligence about al-Qaeda activities using methods 
that contravened either the limits of congressional legislation or the 
Constitution.236  For example, while Congress responded to the 
Opposes Alberto Gonzales To Be Attorney General 4 (Jan. 24, 2005), available 
at http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/us_law/etn/gonzales/statements/hrf-opp 
-gonz-full-012405.pdf. 
In putting forth this interpretation, Gonzales relied on the statutory 
construction of the congressional legislation ratifying the CAT.  During the 
congressional debate over ratification, some members of Congress worried that 
its prohibition on “cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment” might be 
construed to limit sentencing and penal conditions within the United States, 
even when those practices had been upheld by the federal courts as permissible 
under the Eighth Amendments.  Therefore, Congress added a reservation to the 
ratification of the CAT, specifying that Congress understood the ban on “cruel, 
inhuman and degrading treatment” under CAT to be coextensive with 
treatment that “shocks the conscience” and that violates the Fifth and Eighth 
Amendments.  COLE & LOBEL, supra note 233, at 34–35.  During his 
confirmation, Gonzales argued that Congress’s reservation should be read as an 
indication that the CAT did not create any enforceable rights for persons held 
abroad that go beyond the scope of any Fifth and Eighth Amendment rights 
possessed by foreign detainees.  Id. at 35.  Since the U.S. Constitution is not 
generally interpreted to have extraterritorial effect, Gonzales explained, 
persons held abroad have no rights under the Fifth and Eighth Amendment.  
Therefore, Gonzales concluded, the prohibitions on inhumane torture contained 
in the CAT simply do not apply to the U.S. government’s treatment of foreigners 
held abroad.  Id.  Clearly, Gonzales’ post hoc interpretation of the ratification 
proceedings does not reflect the intention of the Senate.  However, some 
observers have defended the power of the executive branch to adopt and apply 
its own interpretation of treaty obligations, even when that interpretation 
appears contrary to the intent of the Senate.  See YOO, supra note 167, at 192–
93. 
After Gonzales was confirmed as Attorney General, Congress passed the 
McCain Amendment in order to clarify the effect on domestic law of its 1990 
CAT reservation.  The McCain Amendment stated that the agents of the U.S. 
government are prohibited from using cruel, inhumane, and degrading conduct 
outside of the United States, and without regard to the nationality of the person 
subjected to the treatment.  In response, President Bush appended a “signing 
statement” to the bill before signing it into law.  COLE & LOBEL, supra note 233, 
at 35–36.  In the signing statement, President Bush asserted the power to 
ignore the McCain Amendment if he decided it was in the interest of the United 
States to do so.  In effect, the Bush administration abandoned any argument 
that the scope of its authority to engage in “enhanced interrogation techniques” 
was premised on an interpretation of congressional legislation passed as part of 
the ratification of the CAT.  Instead, the sole justification relied on by the Bush 
administration for the power to ignore the terms of the CAT is that the 
President has authority under the Constitution to exercise all of the powers 
possessed by “the unitary executive branch,” including the power to employ any 
interrogation technique that it chooses.  Id. 
 236. See generally Bruce Fein, A Defining Constitutional Moment, WASH. 
LAW., May 2006, at 35 (discussing the legality of the Bush administration’s 
expanded surveillance efforts). 
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September 11 attacks by passing the “USA Patriot Act,”237 which 
broadened the government’s ability to wiretap and search 
individuals without any showing of probable cause that such 
individuals had broken any laws,238 the Bush administration acted 
independently of Congress to implement surveillance beyond the 
scope authorized by the USA Patriot Act.  President Bush 
authorized a secret program to engage in wiretapping outside of the 
warrant procedures set forth in the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act (“FISA”), allowing the National Security Agency 
(“NSA”) to spy on Americans without first obtaining a court order.239  
The Bush administration also embarked on a large-scale data 
mining effort under the auspices of the NSA that intercepted and 
analyzed phone records and email communications into and out of 
the United States.240
While seemingly separate undertakings, both the detention and 
surveillance policies were interrelated components of one overall 
strategy: the decision to expand government surveillance efforts was 
directly tied to the decision to question enemy combatants free from 
the usual checks and balances placed on government detention.241  
The September 11 attacks had exposed how little the U.S. 
government knew about al-Qaeda and its intentions.  Government 
officials identified an urgent need to obtain actionable intelligence 
about al-Qaeda through the interrogation of detainees, and to follow 
up on leads obtained through interrogation by intercepting private 
communications and data on financial transactions.242  Therefore, 
the overriding purposes behind the detention policy were forward-
 237. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools 
Required To Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of 
2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272; see also COLE, supra note 226, at 66–68; 
YOO, supra note 85, at 71–73. 
 238. See COLE & LOBEL, supra note 233, at 31; YOO, supra note 85, at 74–75. 
 239. COLE & LOBEL, supra note 233, at 32.  While the warrantless NSA 
surveillance program authorized by President Bush started with the premise 
that only extraterritorial conversations would be monitored, it eventually led to 
the monitoring of some conversations within the United States.  See ATHAN 
THEOHARIS, THE QUEST FOR ABSOLUTE SECURITY 243 (2007).  In January 2007, 
the Bush administration announced that it would henceforth only conduct 
wiretapping operations within the scope of congressional authorization.  COLE & 
LOBEL, supra note 233, at 43.  In a similar example of executive branch 
disregard for FISA procedures, Federal Bureau of Investigation agents 
improperly obtained National Security Letters on a regular basis in order to 
obtain bank, credit card, and Internet information for individuals, many of 
them United States citizens, without a court order.  See SUSKIND, supra note 18, 
at 39; THEOHARIS, supra, at 255–56. 
 240. See YOO, supra note 85, at 107–08. 
 241. See COLE & LOBEL, supra note 233, at 51.  As stated by John Yoo, 
“Military detention is . . . one of our most important sources of intelligence, 
which in turn is our most important tool in this war.”  YOO, supra note 85, at 
151; accord id. at 147 (discussing the benefits of military detention). 
 242. YOO, supra note 85, at 106. 
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looking; imposing punishment for past actions that the prisoner may 
or may not have taken against the United States was reduced to a 
secondary concern. 
While the wisdom and effectiveness of the above tactics 
continue to be debated, what is undisputable is that any action 
taken by the President without specific congressional authorization 
must have some constitutional basis.243  It is not enough to argue 
that increased surveillance of private individuals and enhanced 
interrogation of prisoners provided useful intelligence.  The 
challenge facing the Bush administration was to locate a 
constitutional source of authority for executive branch actions that 
(paradoxically) infringed on constitutionally protected individual 
rights.  The answer to this dilemma was provided by a constitutional 
interpretation called the “theory of the unitary executive.” 
The theory of the unitary executive posits that when the 
President exercises a power delegated to him in Article II of the 
Constitution, he exercises that power without any limitations placed 
on him by the Congress or the Judiciary.244  As explained by John 
Yoo in memos written for the Justice Department’s Office of Legal 
Counsel, and later in subsequent writings, the theory of the unitary 
executive holds that Congress lacks the power to “place any limits 
on the President’s determinations as to any terrorist threat, the 
amount of military force to be used in response, or the method, 
timing, and nature of the response.”245  According to Yoo, the 
Constitution preserves these decisions for the President alone, to be 
made without congressional interference.246
At its most extreme, the theory of the unitary executive leads to 
the assertion that the executive branch possesses all of the military 
power that was possessed by the King of England at the time of the 
American Revolution, minus whatever military power the 
 243. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 585 (1952) 
(“The President’s power, if any, to issue the order must stem either from an act 
of Congress or from the Constitution itself.”). 
 244. See Robert D. Sloane, The Scope of Executive Power in the Twenty-First 
Century: An Introduction, 88 B.U. L. REV. 341, 344 (2008).  See generally 
STEVEN G. CALABRESI & CHRISTOPHER S. YOO, THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE (2008).  
While early proponents of the theory limited its definition of executive branch 
authority to the context of the President’s exclusive power to supervise and 
control executive branch agencies free from congressional interference, later 
proponents expanded the theory to the realm of foreign affairs.  See generally 
GARRY WILLS, BOMB POWER 209–36 (2010). 
 245. JACK GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY: LAW AND JUDGMENT INSIDE 
THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION 98 (2007) (quoting Memorandum from John Yoo, 
Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, to Timothy Flanigan, 
Deputy Counsel to the President, The President’s Constitutional Authority To 
Conduct Military Operations Against Terrorists and Nations Supporting Them 
24 (Sept. 25, 2001)). 
 246. See id.; see also YOO, supra note 167, at 17–24. 
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Constitution expressly grants to Congress.247  The scope of executive 
power is therefore defined only by the scope of the President’s 
responsibilities.248  The logical consequence of the theory of the 
unitary executive is that the President would have the power to take 
any action that is necessary to defend the national security of the 
United States.  The evidence that the Framers intended the power 
of the executive branch to extend so far is slight, and there is much 
evidence to the contrary.249
The influence of the compact theory is reflected in two separate 
premises that underlie the theory of the unitary executive.  First, 
the theory promotes the understanding of the Constitution as a 
contract whereby “the people” agree to surrender certain natural 
rights to the government in exchange for their security.250  In other 
words, natural rights are not inalienable but rather can be 
bargained away by one generation for itself and for its descendants. 
For example, John Yoo argues that the Fourth Amendment to 
 247. GOLDSMITH, supra note 245, at 97; see also United States v. Curtiss-
Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 316 (1936) (“As a result of the separation from 
Great Britain . . . the powers of external sovereignty passed from the 
Crown . . . to the colonies in their collective and corporate capacity as the 
United States of America.”).  See generally YOO, supra note 167, at 39–45 
(locating the source of the broad executive branch power over foreign affairs in 
the eighteenth century conception of the authority of the Crown). 
 248. See GOLDSMITH, supra note 245, at 79. 
 249. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 69, supra note 86, at 414, 416 (Alexander 
Hamilton) (noting that the power of the Commander-in-Chief consists of 
“nothing more than the supreme command and direction of the military and 
naval forces . . . ; while that of the British king extends to the declaring of war 
and to the raising and regulating of fleets and armies—all which, by the 
Constitution under consideration, would appertain to the legislature”); 
Reinstein, supra note 47, at 299–304 (comparing and contrasting the powers 
conferred to the President by the Framers to those held by the British 
monarch); accord WILLS, supra note 244, at 209–36 (criticizing both the theory 
of the unitary executive and its application in legal memos written by John 
Yoo). 
 250. For example, different arguments have been advanced that the 
executive branch has a license to take whatever actions are necessary to secure 
national security, without regard to the powers delegated to it by the 
Constitution.  Some argue that the presidential “prerogative” to act broadly in 
response to a crisis is part of the original constitutional design.  See, e.g., JOHN 
YOO, CRISIS AND COMMAND xii–xiv (2009).  Others put forth Machiavellian 
theories of leadership that applaud Presidents who act to further the long-term 
health and safety of the populace even when they transgress constitutional 
bounds.  See, e.g., CARNES LORD, THE MODERN PRINCE 69–85 (2003).  The 
Supreme Court has considered and rejected the idea that the Constitution 
grants the executive branch a reservoir of emergency powers.  See Youngstown 
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 649–50 (1952) (Jackson, J., 
concurring) (“The appeal, however, that we declare the existence of inherent 
powers ex necessitate to meet an emergency asks us to do what many think 
would be wise, although it is something the forefathers omitted.  They knew 
what emergencies were, knew the pressures they engender for authoritative 
action, knew, too, how they afford a ready pretext for usurpation.”). 
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the Constitution simply does not apply to military searches intended 
to uncover al-Qaeda activities within the United States.251  An 
examination of the language of the Fourth Amendment reveals that 
it does not contain any exception that limits its application during 
wartime.  Only one constitutional provision, the Suspension Clause, 
provides for the limitation of rights during conflict.252  A plain 
reading of the text would therefore suggest that the Fourth 
Amendment protects against unreasonable warrantless searches 
whenever they occur within the United States.  However, Yoo 
argues that the protection of the right to be secure in one’s home 
does not extend to “actions taken to defend the country from foreign 
threats.”253
Under Yoo’s reading, the Fourth Amendment does not express a 
natural right that the federal government is precluded from 
invading.  Instead, the constitutional text is nothing more than a 
bargain.  In his interpretation, the people have agreed to surrender 
rights otherwise guaranteed to them if the federal government 
deems that surrender to be necessary for the protection of the nation 
from outsiders.254  Of course, whether the nature of the threat merits 
this surrender, and whether the surrender is necessary in order to 
respond to the threat, are determinations that Yoo leaves in the 
hands of only one party to the bargain—the executive.  This is a 
Frankenstein view of the executive branch, one that treats it as a 
creature with a life beyond the control of its creator. 
The second way in which the compact view can be seen to 
influence the theory of the unitary executive is that “the people” who 
benefit from the constitutional bargain are defined in such a way as 
to exclude any person who may pose a threat to the security of the 
nation.  John Yoo makes this connection explicit in his arguments 
used to support an inherent presidential power to order torture and 
the invasion of privacy.  In his view, war is waged against foreign 
enemies who are not a part of the “American political community.”255  
Therefore, the tactics employed by the executive branch during 
wartime are not limited in any way by the Constitution’s framework 
of individual rights and separation of powers.256  That framework, 
 251. YOO, supra note 85, at 82. 
 252. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 9, cl. 2.
 253. YOO, supra note 85, at 82. 
 254. Yoo explicitly places military action outside of the warrant requirement 
of the Fourth Amendment, calling the authority to engage in military searches 
a “distinct legal regime[]” from the criminal justice system.  Id.  His lone 
support for severing military action from constitutional constraints is a citation 
to United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 273 (1990).  Under this 
view, this citation makes clear the connection between the compact theory as 
employed in immigration cases and its use as a legal justification for the tactics 
employed in the War on Terror. 
 255. YOO, supra note 85, at 16. 
 256. See id. at 162 (“[E]nemy aliens are not part of the American political 
community and do not have the same constitutional rights as its actual 
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according to Yoo, only applies to the relationship between the people 
and their government during peacetime.257  Yoo concludes that the 
“clear, strict rules” that delineate the limits of the power of the 
federal government under our constitutional system should not be 
applied to place any constraint on the form of power that the federal 
government asserts against its enemies.258
The theory of the unitary executive as described by John Yoo 
operates under the assumption that unlawful enemy combatant 
status renders the individual an “outsider” to the U.S. political 
community and therefore that an unlawful enemy combatant is 
precluded from asserting either the individual rights granted by the 
Constitution or the structural limits that the Constitution places on 
federal government authority.259  Under this theory, the executive 
branch alone possesses the authority to decide which individuals 
receive enemy combatant status.260  Yoo’s explanation of the theory 
members.”). 
 257. Id. at 16. 
 258. Id.  Yoo gives no citations in support of this interpretation.  The Fourth 
Circuit explicitly rejected this argument in al-Marri v. Pucciarelli, 534 F.3d 213 
(4th Cir. 2008), vacated sub nom. al-Marri v. Spagone, 129 S. Ct. 1545 (2009): 
The Government summarily argues that even if the AUMF does not 
authorize al-Marri’s seizure and indefinite detention as an enemy 
combatant, the President has “inherent constitutional authority” to 
order the military to seize and detain al-Marri. According to the 
Government, the President’s “war-making powers” afford him 
“inherent” authority to subject persons legally residing in this country 
and protected by our Constitution to military arrest and detention, 
without the benefit of any criminal process, if the President believes 
these individuals have “engaged in conduct in preparation for acts of 
international terrorism.” . . .   Given that the Government has now 
acknowledged that aliens lawfully residing in the United States have 
the same due process rights as United States citizens, this is a 
breathtaking claim—and one that no member of the court embraces. 
al-Marri, 534 F.3d at 247. 
 259. Congress seemingly acquiesced in this broad assertion of executive 
power.  The legislation sought and obtained by the Bush administration as part 
of its response to the September 11 attacks, such as the Patriot Act and the 
Military Commissions Act, consistently sought to insulate the exercise of these 
broad powers from legal challenges in three ways: by foreclosing direct review of 
executive branch action in federal court; by limiting the utility of the writ of 
habeas corpus to challenge government detention; and by curtailing the 
procedural due process rights of suspected terrorists. 
 260. An accompanying benefit of outsider status (from the perspective of 
those advancing this theory) is that unlawful enemy combatants do not enjoy 
prisoner-of-war status under international law and therefore cannot appeal to 
any alternative legal regime of human rights that might afford protection to 
enemy combatants.  See GOLDSMITH, supra note 245, at 110.  Jack Goldsmith, 
former assistant attorney general at the Office of Legal Counsel during the time 
period immediately following the formulation of the Bush administration’s 
policy on military tribunals and interrogation techniques, defends this result.  
He writes: “The bottom line was that none of the detainees in the war on 
terrorism would receive POW status or any other legal protection under the 
laws of war.  This was a congenial conclusion to the administration, which 
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implies that the executive branch also possesses the power to police 
the domestic membership of the American political community, and 
could therefore adopt procedures for expelling disloyal citizens from 
the compact.261
CONCLUSION: THE DELEGATION VIEW RE-ASCENDANT 
Ever since 1789, the original understanding of the Constitution 
as a charter of delegated powers to the federal government has been 
in conflict with a competing interpretation of the Constitution: the 
view that the text should be read as a compact between the states 
and between the federal government and a discrete population of 
individual members.  Even as academics have largely ignored the 
implications of reading the Constitution in contractarian terms, 
each of the three branches of the federal government has taken 
actions that reflect the assumption that the Constitution should be 
read as a compact.  A careful examination of the choice between a 
delegation view and a compact view of the Constitution is necessary, 
however, because the choice illuminates the constraints placed on 
the exercise of federal power. 
The government’s bailouts of financial firms and automobile 
manufacturers have led some observers to charge that the federal 
government has overstepped its proper bounds and 
unconstitutionally intruded into the private market.262  Similarly, 
opponents of health-reform legislation have objected to the 
constitutionality of both the federal government’s exercise of 
regulatory control over the market for health insurance and 
imposition of an individual mandate to purchase private health 
insurance.263  Unease over government actions in the War on Terror 
that impinge on personal privacy or diminish civil liberties has 
combined with opposition over these government interventions in 
the free market to inspire the growth of the Tea Party Movement as 
a political phenomenon.264
wanted to maintain flexibility in the face of a new type of enemy, with unknown 
capacities; to interrogate detainees in a way that POW status would have 
precluded; and to avoid future scrutiny under the War Crimes Act, which 
basically applies only if the Geneva Conventions do.”  Id. 
 261. See COLE, supra note 226, at 69–71 (discussing citizenship-stripping 
provisions of the draft Domestic Security Enhancement Act); see also al-Marri v. 
Wright, 487 F.3d 160, 186–87 (4th Cir. 2007) (“Neither Quirin nor any other 
precedent even suggests, as the Government seems to believe, that individuals 
with constitutional rights, unaffiliated with the military arm of any enemy 
government, can be subjected to military jurisdiction and deprived of those 
rights solely on the basis of their conduct on behalf of an enemy organization.”). 
 262. See Andrew Napolitano, Editorial, Unconstitutional Bailout, N.Y. SUN, 
July 17, 2008, http://www.nysun.com/opinion/unconstitutional-bailout/82095. 
 263. See Randy Barnett et al., Why the Personal Mandate To Buy Health 
Insurance Is Unprecedented and Unconstitutional, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY LEGAL 
MEMORANDUM (Heritage Found., D.C.), Dec. 9, 2009, at 1. 
 264. See Gerald F. Seib, Tea Party Holds Risks for GOP, WALL ST. J., Mar. 2, 
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Criticism of these exercises of federal government authority 
reflects the persistent force of the original understanding of the 
Constitution as a charter.  An examination of the characteristics of 
the delegation view reveals why it may hold an appeal for the loose 
confederation of libertarians, free-market advocates, and states’ 
rights proponents that comprise the Tea Party Movement.  The 
pendulum of popular opinion may be swinging back to the 
delegation view precisely because it promotes several core 
constitutional values that are not present under the compact view. 
For example, one unique aspect of the delegation view is that 
under a charter, the text’s grant of authority to the federal 
government is policed by the entire public, not just by the narrow 
universe of parties to the contract.  James Madison wrote: “As metes 
and bounds of government, [charters] transcend all other land-
marks, because every public usurpation is an encroachment on the 
private right, not of one, but of all.”265  For this reason, Madison 
considered the charter to be the supreme form of contract.  Unlike 
other types of contracts, which are only enforceable by the parties to 
the agreement, a charter creates an interest even on the part of 
nonparties.266  Everyone—insiders and outsiders alike—benefits 
when outsiders are granted the power to enforce structural 
limitations on the federal government. 
Another attraction of the delegation view is that, unlike the 
compact view, the delegation view places primacy on the sovereignty 
of “the people.”  “The people” are the direct creators of the federal 
government and, as such, must of necessity continue to possess any 
2010, at A2. 
 265. Madison, Charters, supra note 67, at 508.  It is because of this common 
interest, shared by all citizens, in the government’s adherence to the limits of 
its charter (“keeping every portion of power within its proper limits”) that 
Madison believed that future citizens would be motivated to “support the 
energy of their constitutional charters.”  Id. 
 266. The implications of this different focus can be observed by comparing a 
charter to the modern economic conception of a business corporation as a “nexus 
of contracts.”  The nexus-of-contracts view conceives of a corporation as “a web 
of explicit and implicit contracts establishing rights and obligations among the 
various parties making up the firm.”  STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION 
LAW AND ECONOMICS 8 (2002).  In the context of corporate law, the pure 
contractual view has two characteristics.  First, it emphasizes the limited 
universe of individuals who can claim to possess rights within the corporate 
enterprise, thereby implicitly rejecting any public interest in the exercise of 
those rights.  Second, conceptualizing the corporation as a nexus of contracts 
places a primary value on the freedom of the participants in the firm to agree to 
whatever terms that they desire.  The content of those terms is unimportant, so 
long as those terms are expressed in the foundational corporate documents.  
Certain participants in the corporate enterprise, such as board members or 
majority shareholders, may even divert the economic benefits of the enterprise 
to themselves, at the expense of other participants, so long as that power is 
granted to them in the foundational agreement.  The role of the state, in such a 
system, is merely to enforce the private bargain. 
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sovereign power that they did not see fit to delegate to that body.  It 
is not only presumptuous for the federal government to claim more 
power than the Constitution grants, it is also a direct assault on the 
sovereignty of the people. 
Critics call this concept of popular sovereignty a fiction.  They 
point out that there is no mechanism under the Constitution for a 
body of national “people” to meet or act—thereby leaving the federal 
government as the de facto possessor of absolute sovereignty.267  
However, even if popular sovereignty is in some sense a fiction, 
belief in this fiction has the practical effect of inspiring both the 
public at large and government officials to behave as if “the people” 
truly are the ultimate sovereign.268  Political symbols, such as the 
idea of popular sovereignty, derive their power from their tendency 
to cause believers to modify conduct in conformity with ideals.269  
The delegation view of the Constitution inspires government 
officials to adopt policies that subject all official action to public 
accountability and control.270
Opponents of an expanding federal presence in the economy 
also likely prefer the delegation view to the compact view because 
the latter facilitates the power of the executive branch to grow and 
to expand beyond the powers expressly delegated to it.  For example, 
the theory of the unitary executive places the actions of the 
 267. See BERNARD CRICK, IN DEFENCE OF POLITICS 69–73 (4th ed. 1992); see 
also READ, supra note 14, at 116 (“The idea of ‘the sovereignty of the people,’ if 
it makes sense at all, does so only at a very high level of abstraction.”).  
Nevertheless, early constitutional expositors such as Chief Justice John 
Marshall believed that popular sovereignty exists in fact under the 
Constitution, despite the lack of any means for it to be exercised other than 
through the vehicle of a constitutional convention.  See NEWMYER, supra note 
24, at 345. 
 268. READ, supra note 14, at 116. 
 269. Id. (citing EDMUND MORGAN, INVENTING THE PEOPLE 13–14 (1988)).  
Susan Neiman argues persuasively that a belief in moral ideals can transform 
our reality: 
In the eighteenth century the idea that even all white men were 
created equal was anything but obvious; most of the world thought it 
patently false.  In 1776 a band of colonials had the audacity to declare 
the idea self-evident—and thereby began to make it come true. 
SUSAN NEIMAN, MORAL CLARITY 43 (2008); cf. GEORGE ORWELL, England Your 
England, in A COLLECTION OF ESSAYS 252, 261 (1981) (“In England such 
concepts as justice, liberty, and objective truth are still believed in.  They may 
be illusions, but they are very powerful illusions.  The belief in them influences 
conduct, national life is different because of them.”). 
 270. The compact view fosters a lack of transparency in government.  The 
Bush administration was criticized for excessive secrecy and a lack of 
accountability for its antiterrorism policies.  See, e.g., COLE & LOBEL, supra note 
233, at 40–47.  The expanding sphere of government information that is 
classified and therefore withheld from the public has grown over the years in 
direct proportion with the assertion that the Constitution grants the executive 
branch an absolute power over national security matters.  See WILLS, supra 
note 244, at 137–40. 
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President outside of congressional control.  Beyond replacing the 
President via election or impeachment, the citizenry is left with no 
ability to employ their elected representatives in order to constrain 
executive action directed at outsiders.  Insofar as it acts against 
“outsiders” to the Constitution, the compact view leaves the 
executive branch unchained from both the delegated powers of 
Article II and the structural constraints imposed by the separation 
of powers. 
Finally, it can be argued that the delegation view promotes a 
greater regard for the protection of human rights than does the 
compact view.271  This is because the unbounded power that the 
compact view places in the hands of executive branch officials is 
limited only by the individual moral compasses of those officials.  
For example, waterboarding and other extreme forms of 
interrogation are viewed as immoral by many persons.272  Observers 
have questioned how such tactics could have been adopted as official 
government policy.  One conclusion is that moral values of 
individual government officials are insufficient to prevent the 
adoption of morally questionable policies.  “[M]ost evil is done by 
people who never made up their minds to be or do either evil or 
good.”273  Government officials will always be tempted to believe that 
they are “as intrinsically good as their opponents [are] intrinsically 
evil,” and to assume that any policies that they adopt are morally 
justified.274  Structural limitations that prevent absolute power from 
being lodged in the hands of any single government official provide 
greater security for human rights than does a blind faith in the 
moral compasses of the men and women in government.275  The 
delegation view was favored by the Framers of the Constitution 
because it provides this very measure of security. 
 271. See COLE & LOBEL, supra note 233, at 5. 
 272. The debate over the morality of torture continues to this date.  See, e.g., 
Mark Oppenheimer, Catholic Defender of Waterboarding Gets an Earful from 
Critics, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2010, at A19. 
 273. HANNAH ARENDT, THINKING 180 (1978). 
 274. NEIMAN, supra note 269, at 338–39. 
 275. A faith in the moral compasses of individuals cannot prevent societies 
from committing immoral acts.  See JONATHAN GLOVER, HUMANITY 401–04 
(1999).  Steven Pinker aptly summarizes Glover’s key observations: 
No one is a saint, and most people calibrate their conscience against a 
level of minimum decency expected of people in their peer group or 
culture. When the level drifts downward, people can commit horrible 
crimes with the confidence that comes from knowing that “everyone 
does it.”  Euphemisms like ‘‘resettlement to work camps,’’ phased 
decisions (in which bombing targets might shift from isolated factories 
to factories near neighborhoods to the neighborhoods themselves) and 
the diffusion of responsibility within a bureaucracy can lead 
conscientious people to cause appalling outcomes that no one would 
ever willingly choose on his own. 
Steven Pinker, All About Evil, N.Y. TIMES BK. REV., Oct. 29, 2000, at14, 14–15 
(reviewing JONATHAN GLOVER, HUMANITY (2000)). 
W05_FALLONE 10/18/2010  11:45:59 AM 
1124 WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45 
After decades during which it appeared that the compact view 
of the Constitution was ascendant, it is possible that we are 
currently poised on the cusp of a re-ascendance of the delegation 
view.  Once again, the current generation of voters is being 
presented with divergent views of the original understanding of the 
Constitution.  As the foregoing discussion illustrates, both the 
delegation and compact view of the Constitution have deep roots in 
our nation’s history.  Regardless of which view captures the 
imagination of contemporary voters, the public will benefit from a 
debate that underscores the differences between reading the 
Constitution as a charter or a compact. 
 
